























































































































Following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, cheap Chinese garments have 
flooded clothing markets worldwide bringing to fruition the prophecy of Chinese 
hegemony in a liberalised global clothing market (Kaplinsky 2005; Nordas 2004; and 
Kaplinsky et al 2006). South Africa’s domestic market has, unexceptionally, also 
been adversely affected by rising Chinese imports evidenced by i) a falling relative 
contribution of apparel to total manufacturing output and ii) persistent job loss in the 
sector (Kaplan 2003; Barnes 2004). China has significantly increased its footprint in 
the South African clothing market over the past decade.  
 
Table 1 shows China’s overwhelming dominance in South African imports in the two 
main clothing categories HS Chapters 61 and 62. The Chinese market share of 
aggregate South African clothing imports rose steadily from 21.58% in 1996 to 
78.49% in 2006 and if Hong Kong is included then its share in 2006 was 81.23%.  
 
Table 1: Sources of RSA imports of HS61, 62 as share of total clothing imports: 1996‐2007 
HS61 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
China 25.77 28.40 33.64 38.82 50.42 53.73 58.27 68.81 74.47 75.59 77.13 64.85 
India 2.12 3.32 3.41 4.33 4.02 3.30 2.91 4.12 3.81 4.56 3.79 6.21 
Mauritius 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.83 1.31 0.41 1.89 1.91 1.42 2.03 3.27 5.74 
Hong Kong 9.06 6.48 6.77 5.95 6.93 7.87 7.46 5.47 5.10 3.89 2.77 2.62 
Indonesia 1.48 1.26 3.56 3.38 3.58 2.41 2.34 1.61 0.76 0.57 0.61 2.06 
Myanmar 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.46 1.96 
             
HS62 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
China 18.15 17.53 15.35 22.16 48.75 48.55 51.96 64.92 74.25 73.10 79.51 59.29 
Hong Kong 8.77 5.34 5.83 7.24 7.44 7.90 5.86 4.50 4.21 3.77 2.71 5.39 
India 21.36 25.44 21.25 16.53 14.50 10.48 8.38 7.91 6.42 8.61 4.20 5.22 
Malawi 17.51 19.32 26.34 24.34 7.56 11.34 14.92 6.56 3.61 3.20 1.97 2.96 
Indonesia 1.10 1.67 2.67 3.75 1.45 1.12 1.74 0.96 0.67 0.96 0.77 2.96 
Mauritius 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.45 0.29 0.26 0.52 1.21 2.57 
             
HS61&62 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
China 21.58 22.36 22.73 28.48 49.39 50.68 54.43 66.37 74.34 74.22 78.49 61.88 
India 12.70 15.61 14.05 11.91 10.50 7.52 6.24 6.50 5.35 6.92 4.02 5.69 
Hong Kong 8.90 5.85 6.21 6.75 7.24 7.89 6.49 4.86 4.58 3.82 2.74 4.10 
Mauritius 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.42 0.59 0.29 1.02 0.89 0.74 1.15 2.10 4.05 
Indonesia 1.27 1.49 3.03 3.61 2.26 1.66 1.98 1.20 0.89 0.74 1.15 2.54 
Bangladesh 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.36 0.44 0.38 0.50 0.74 2.24 






Furthermore, almost all of China’s recent growth occurred in quota lines. Figure 1 
below shows the share of China in total quota imports into South Africa by value (as 
a line) and volume (as columns). From 2000 to 2006 China increased its value share 




                             Data source: Clotrade 
 
Indeed, it is argued, South Africa has been more disadvantaged by China’s entry into 
the WTO than most of Sub-Saharan Africa due to the AGOA triple transformation 
rule, which discriminates its exports to the US more than those of all other Sub-
Saharan countries (excl. Mauritius) (Gibbon 2002a; Gibbon 2003; Morris and 
Kaplinsky 2006; and AGOA 2006). However there is one caveat; whereas increased 
Chinese import penetration worldwide is generally a consequence of the removal of 
MFA quotas, this is not applicable to South Africa, where quotas were never in effect. 
Instead, Chinese imports were triggered by a sudden depreciation in the currency 
which pressed local retailers to seek alternative (mainly Chinese) suppliers abroad as 
local suppliers opted to export their product. Moreover, whilst fierce competition from 
Chinese imports is certainly a contributing factor, it is not considered exclusively to 
blame for the sector’s poor performance. Other factors offered in explanation of 
falling employment and output levels in the industry include a deteriorating export 
performance, currency appreciation, inconsistent extension of the Duty Credit 




et al 2006). However, some leading analysts go further to contend that rising Chinese 
imports is not a cause, but merely a symptom of underlying problems with the sector 
itself (Barnes et al 2006 and Morris 2007).  
 
The government’s response to warnings of imminent industry collapse was a botched 
Customised Sector Plan and then to negotiate with China to agree quantitative 
restraints on imports of certain textile and apparel products originating in China. The 
Memorandum of Understanding signed between South Africa and China in 
September 2006 (Government Gazette, 2006) established annual quotas through 
2008 on - mostly cotton and cotton-rich - made-up garments and fabrics spanning 31, 
mainly HS61 and 62, tariff lines. The rationale: “ To give the sector an opportunity to 
restructure and become globally competitive…by encouraging local retailers to 
source from local manufacturers” (Patel, General Secretary of SACTWU). The DTI’s 
explicit aims of the China quota policy were to a) raise employment in the industry 
and b) rejuvenate domestic production by providing temporary relief from intense 
Chinese competition (DTI 2006). It aim was to afford further protection to an industry 
which already nestles behind the highest tariff walls in the economy.1 
 
The adoption of this measure was highly controversial, eliciting a vocal and public 
outcry from industry retailers and clothing manufacturers. The textile sector was 
muted, but ultimately supportive of the initiative. Disagreements over the lack of 
consultation with industry players were the focal point of contention. There were also 
differences over the design, scope, implementation mechanism, and quota allocation. 
Although the DTI claimed the quotas were instituted on behalf of requests from 
Clotrade and SACTWU starting in 2004, Clotrade objected strenuously to the 
proposal when the decision was sprung on the industry in mid 2006. With no 
movement from the DTI on the original 2004 request, Clotrade had abandoned this 
as a measure which could be of any use. The clothing manufacturers had instead 
began successfully to build a business alliance with the domestic retailers and create 
value chain alignment in the sector as the most effective way of laying the foundation 
for a sustainable clothing sector in South Africa (Business Alliance 2006). The China 
quota restraint, in both its mode of implementation and modus operandi, was 
                                                
1 Although the average import weighted tariff on apparel has almost halved since 1993, now 40% for clothing 




perceived as a direct attack on the retailers and hence ran counter to these 
initiatives.  In effect the China quota policy became an initiative of SACTWU under 
the aegis of the DTI.   
 
The expectation that the China quotas will reduce the importation of cheap Chinese 
goods is predicated on the assumption that Chinese imports will be substituted for 
locally produced goods and that the South African industry is internationally 
competitive once Chinese imports are disregarded. The competitiveness issue has 
increased in complexity over the past decade. Specifically, it is noted that, whilst 
price is still the primary determinant of competitiveness, it is no longer the sole 
determinant (Barnes et al 2006; Gereffi 2003; Gereffi and Memedovic 2003). China 
derives a major competitive advantage from a combination of low wages and high 
productivity and the production of high-quality and low cost inputs (Kaplinsky 2005 
and Barnes et al 2006). However, many other Asian economies, such as 
Bangladesh, are rapidly developing similarly derived comparative advantage from 
abundant cheap labour and the availability of cheap high-quality fabric. Since the 
quotas do not restrict retailers to China in their search for low cost clothing, it is 
argued (in Hazelhurst 2006b and Barnes et al 2006) that it is not simply South 
Africa’s inefficiency relative to China that is the problem, but rather its inefficiency 
relative to Asia as a whole.  
 
The South African clothing manufacturing industry is uncompetitive, lacking both 
skills and technology (Hazelhurst 2006b) whilst having relatively high labour costs 
(USITC 2004). But the future is not all doom and gloom. The emergence of “lean 
manufacturing” which requires quick turn-around and short lead times has provided 
South African firms with something to offer that their Chinese counterparts can’t - 
speed and flexibility. Hence, fast production and proximity to local markets, rather 
than price and volume, are recognised as the basis on which local firms can compete 
(Bleby 2006). Getting co-operation along the value chain from retailer to 
manufacturer is fundamental to this process and great strides have been taken at the 
industry level - with the exclusion of national government - towards achieving this 





It is against this backdrop that the largely unanticipated response of the clothing 
manufacturers to the DTI’s quota decision should be understood. Clotrade, the 
industry’s representative body, gave three reasons for its decision to unreservedly 
withdraw its support of quotas: i) The quotas came too late since most of the 
unemployment, which quotas were intended to mitigate, has already and irreversibly, 
occurred (Brink 2007); ii) The quotas were a threat to the retailer-manufacturer 
alliance (Bisseker 2006a). Manufacturers are trying to connect with the value chains 
of which retailers are the drivers; therefore, any industrial policy which is antagonistic 
to the retailers is self defeating; iii) Many local manufacturers are themselves 
importers of both fabric and finished garments who would be disadvantaged by 
quantitative restrictions on certain tariff lines subject to quotas.  
 
Three outcomes are possible at the end of 2008, the scheduled expiration date for 
the China quotas. There will either be i) more local firms supplying the market with 
increased employment, indicative of a reinvigorated clothing manufacturing sector 
which is responsive to the growing internal market; or ii) the same number of local 
firms with more imported goods and increased employment, where the relative 
percentage of local to imported goods remains constant but grows as domestic 
demand expands; or iii) less local firms and decreased employment despite growing 
internal demand as imports from other countries are substituted for locally produced 
items. This will portend the collapse of the local industry as local firms fold under the 
competitive pressures of global competition.  
 
The objectives of this report are to: 
• analyse the impact of quotas on output and employment so far;  
• assess how successful import restrictions have been in terms of achieving the 
stated policy objectives of the DTI; 
• reconcile these outcomes with those forecast by industry;  
• evaluate the effectiveness of quotas as an economic policy tool, drawing on 
the experiences of the US which invoked similar restrictions, and the 
economic justification for their continued existence in South Africa.  
 
Section 1 introduces the issues and situates China in an historical and current trade 




for lessons on the likely impact of quotas on employment and output in South Africa. 
Section 3 outlines the industry’s predictions and forecasts for the outcome of quotas 
and establishes guidelines for discussion. The report then deals with 2007 and 2008 
separately. Section 4 analyses trade flows in imports in the two main clothing 
Chapters HS61 and HS62, focusing on quantitative and qualitative changes in trade 
flows as well as trading partners and comparing import activity in non quota and 
quota lines. The principle objective of this Section is to investigate whether quotas 
led to import diversion. This continues in Section 5 with an investigation into the 
beneficiaries of import diversion. Section 6 reports on supply chain disruption from 
quotas and motivations for their occurrence. Section 7 looks at the impact of quotas 
on employment to establish empirically what employment trends have been since the 
imposition of quotas. Section 8 deals with the impact of quotas on price. Section 9 
discusses the evidence from the second year of quotas in 2008. Section 10 
evaluates the evidence from a 2008 survey of clothing firms on the effectiveness of 
quotas as an intervention. Section 11 evaluates the justification for quotas in the light 
of the above. Section 12 concludes. 
 
The report draws on primary quota literature and macro-economic trade and 
statistical data. Qualitative evidence and quantitative information was obtained from 
various sources including i) interviews conducted with 15 clothing and 5 textiles 
manufacturing firms in the Western Cape and KZN in 2007; ii) a survey of 50 clothing 
manufacturing firms in 2008; iii) telephonic, e-mail and personal interviews with 5 
retailers and v) consultation with key experts.  
 
1. An historical perspective on China 
The clothing industry is characterised by global value chains, where the 
manufacturing process is segmented into a series of individual components, which 
are allocated to foreign suppliers on the basis of comparative advantage. Skill 
intensive tasks concentrate in developed countries, while low-skilled labour-intensive 
tasks are outsourced to developing countries with low labour costs. The Multifibre 
Agreement (MFA) was designed to protect the high value-added segments of the 
value chain in developed countries. As such, the MFA was a quota-based 




States and major trade destinations across Europe, affording a high level of 
protection to clothing industries in developed countries whilst muting the participation 
of non-preferred trading partners such as China. Indeed, until 2005, China’s 
presence in the global clothing market was effectively mitigated by quotas, since it 
had to either buy quota or invest in manufacturing plant in countries which had 
excess quota.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the decision to liberalise following China’s Accession to the WTO in 
2001 was very controversial because of the contribution that the clothing and textile 
sectors make to employment in developed countries (Nordas 2004). Following a 
protracted phase-down period, quota restrictions were finally lifted in January 2005, 
although this final step was not completely unchecked. The end of the MFA 
contained a safeguard measure, which gave the US, EU and Japan the right to erect 
short term emergency barriers against Chinese imports under certain proviso. 
 
Since 2005, China’s participation in the global clothing market has accelerated (See 
Table 2: China’s share of world exports of clothing and textiles (US$ million)Table 
2). China is currently the world’s largest exporter of garments with over 40% (Hong 
Kong included) share of global clothing trade.  
 
Table 2: China’s share of world exports of clothing and textiles (US$ million) 
Exports Clothing % World Total 
Country 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1990-2004 
%  change 
1990 2006 
China 1,625 9,669 24,049 36,071 41,302 52,061 61,856 74,163 95388 984% 8.9% 30.6% 
Hong Kong 4,976 15,406 21,297 24,214 22,343 23,152 25,097 27,292 28391 63% 14.2% 9.1% 
World 40,590 108,129 158,353 197,498 202,310 225,940 258,097 277,971 311,410 188% 100% 100% 
Exports Textiles    
China  7219  16135   33428 41050 48683 574% 6.9% 22.3% 
Hong Kong  8213  13441   14296 13830 13910 69% 7.9% 6.4% 
World  104354  158579   195541 205135 218594 109% 100% 100% 
  (WTO 2007; Morris and Einhorn 2008) 
 
China’s clothing exports to the world grew from $9.7 billion in 1990 to $115 billion in 
2007, an increase of 1092% (WTO).  
 
An analysis of China’s exports into European Union (EU) following the termination of 









































                          Morris and Sedowski 2006 
 
China’s comparative advantage is attributed to a number of factors, including a 
dexterous, dedicated, coordinated, non-militant and low-cost labour force2; a stable 
but undervalued currency; and diligent investment in new manufacturing technologies 
(Kipling 2008)3.  Although labour costs are not the lowest relative to many Asian and 
SSA competitor countries, labour is not the unique factor in sourcing decisions 
(Morris 2007), with labour productivity (which is especially high in China), quality and 
cost of fabric, lead times and services offered to apparel importers or brands, import 
tariff rates and the cost of freight also playing an important role (Emerging Textiles 
2008b). China’s dominance was further enhanced by active participation by 
government in the development process. A combination of low interest, non-
repayable loans and cash export incentives, coupled with an undervalued currency 
gave China a comparative advantage which WTO-compliant countries could not 
match (Kipling 2008)4.  
 
The lynchpin of China’s success lies ultimately with its industrial policies. China 
prioritized unemployment and job creation and structured a development plan aimed 
solely at achieving this purpose. The plan had four legs: i) identifying labour intensive 
and mutually beneficial industries (clothing, footwear, luggage and toys) with 
complementary skills (stitching) and markets; ii) if the industry was export oriented, 
industries were developed by a port; iii) skills and people were concentrated to 
encourage specialization, reinforced through specialised education systems which 
                                                
2 Morris 2007 notes that, contrary to popular opinion, low wages are not the most significant factor as Chinese 
wages are significantly higher than other producer countries in SE Asia or in SSA. A recent research report 
reveals that there are seven Asian countries that are now offering lower labour costs than China. Labour is not 
the unique factor in sourcing decisions - labour productivity, quality/cost of fabric, lead times and services 
offered , import tariff rate and the cost of freight  also rank in import decisions (Emergingtextiles 2008). 
3 Interview 15 July 2008. 




were developed; iv) a critical mass of clothing firms was achieved5 off the back of 
which a viable textiles industry was developed and thereafter, in similar fashion, a 
clothing machine equipment manufacturing industry.  
 
As China achieved a critical mass, scale economies and productivity gains were 
accompanied by a simultaneous fall in prices. Table 4 (above) demonstrates the 
consistent fall in prices and rise in volumes into the EU across garment categories 
between 2004 and 2005. Imports into the United States show a similar trend; the 
Dollar value of imports rose by 69.93% between 2004 and 2005 whilst the square 
metre equivalent rose by 97.99% (Morris 2007). This price deflation lies at the heart 
of the China story. This impact has two aspects: First, the competitiveness aspect 
which is concerned with the pressure that imports have applied on the 
competitiveness of local producers forcing them to radically upgrade to meet new 
price, quality and reliability demands6 (Barnes and Esselaar 2005 and Morris 2007). 
Second, the welfare aspect which is concerned with the impact of imports on 
employment in the local clothing industry and on the general standard of living of the 
masses of consumers. This topic has important policy implications and will be 
revisited and expanded in detail in later sections. The discussion proceeds with an 
overview of at the impact of safeguards on the US garment industry. 
2. Lessons from Safeguards in the United States7 
In January 2006, the US government initiated safeguards on a range of textile and 
apparel products deemed “quota-free” since China’s accession into the WTO 
(http://www.fda.gov/oia/Agreements). The decision to proceed with safeguards 
culminated two years of investigation and consultation by the USITC into allegations 
that items in the restricted categories were being imported from China into the US in 
such increased quantities, or under such conditions, so as to cause, or threaten to 
cause, market disruption to the domestic producers operating in the US of like or 
directly competitive products (USITC 2004). Safeguards prescribe that imports are 
                                                
5 Kipling 2008 stresses that the critical point here is the recognition that clothing and textiles is a numbers game 
where volumes count. Consequently, the initial part of development focused solely on achieving a critical mass 
of clothing firms with up to 50% of all textile inputs imported in 2004. Currently China has 16 million 
employees in clothing and only 4 million in fabric. In South Africa these ratios are reversed.  
6 As one retailer puts it: “If local can make wanted product at the right price we purchase  local. If not, we go 
off-shore.” Local industry either adapts to the new market conditions or loses out. 
7 The imposition of safeguards resulted from the post MFA impact of Chinese imports in 2005... The surge in 




restricted to a maximum of 7.5% above the previous year’s quantity (USITC 2004). 
This move was unprecedented and ran very much against the spirit of liberalised 
trade, which motivated the dissolution of the MFA. The relief afforded by safeguards 
was intended as temporary (until 2008) and for the purpose of providing time for the 
industry to adjust to import competition. Safeguard quotas were supposed to i) 
reduce reliance on imports to meet domestic demand by rejuvenating local 
manufacturing output and ii) improve employment levels in the sector which have 
fallen consistently since January 2001.  
 
The evidence to date is contraindicative to these outcomes. Safeguards have led to i) 
import diversion, ii) suppression of domestic prices and iii) migration to higher 
value-added garments with the implication of downgrading in the local supply chain.  
2.1 Import diversion and round­tripping 
In their immediate wake, safeguards did successfully reduce imports from China into 
the United States, which fell by 14.64% and 10.67% in volume and value terms for 
the first six months of 2006. Almost all of the decreases occurred in restricted 
categories. Chinas share in total imports fell accordingly as shown in Figure 2 below. 
What is more, aggregate US imports fell in both volume and value terms by - 2.36% 








The impact of safeguards in the immediate aftermath of their imposition primarily 
stemmed from the uncertainty surrounding the process of their implementation.  The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was only signed in mid-November 2005. So 
for most of 2005, the safeguards were applied on a piecemeal basis because the 
visa system was not yet in place. Hence firms had no guarantee that they would 
actually receive ordered product. Firms operate with extended lead times of about six 
months from date of placing their orders. So, although the firms placing orders would 
have guaranteed access to quota, in order to ensure guaranteed access to actual 
product, many of them had already switched to alternative country suppliers. There 
was virtually no growth in U.S. imports (2005-06) for safeguard items.  
 
Furthermore the quotas were not fully utilized in 2006.  However, once a stable 
system was in place, in 2007 (Jan-Nov), U.S. imports in the quota categories from 
China actually increased by 12 percent.8 This was because the MOU created stability 
that made it "safe" to increase sourcing again from China. However firms did not shift 
all their sourcing of quota product back to China. Once started import diversion also 
stabilized, confirming predictions by some pundits that the sourcing of imports from 
alternative low cost countries to China, mainly in response to limitations on Chinese 
products9, is likely to be a permanent phenomenon rather than a knee-jerk reaction 
by US importers (Emerging Textiles 2007a). Vietnam, for example, has gradually 
strengthened its foothold in the US apparel import market since safeguards were 
initiated10. Shipments from this region surged 34.44% in US$ and 35.27% in volume 
terms compared with same period in 200611 (Emerging Textiles 2007a). At the end of 
2007, Vietnam lay in third place (behind Mexico) with a 5.90% market share 
equivalent to US$4.36 billion. Shipments from Bangladesh also surged. In 2007 its 
import share was 4.20% (US$3.10 billion). (Emerging Textiles 2008a; OTEXA 2008) 
 
Total imports from China fell 15% in December 2007, which may indicate a sourcing 
shift in the near term. Interviews with the large U.S. apparel importers reveal that 
                                                
8 Quota utilisation was much higher in 2007 than 2006, indicating some reversion to Chinese sourcing. In some 
categories - fill rates were up as much as 18% - 25% on the previous year. (Emergingtextiles 2007)      
9 Although a rapidly rising Yaun and increasing production costs are also having an impact. 
10 This also involves a relocation of some Chinese clothing companies to Vietnam. 
11 Imports from Vietnam have continued to show robust growth in the first half of 2008, up 25% on the 




they actively seek alternatives to China to balance risks and costs12. This is 
corroborated by recent announcements from some large trading houses about a 
potential sourcing shift from China to other origins (Emerging Textiles 2008a). 
 
Table 5: U.S. General Imports from China in Square Meters, millions 2004 ‐2007 





Total all products  11,662.2 16,763.0 18,613.5 17,111.7 19,879.2 
Subtotal safeguard categories 4,913.9 7,322.4 7,367.8 6,755.6 7,574.7 
Subtotal non-safeguard categories 6,748.4 9,440.6 11,245.7 10,356.1 12,304.5 
    39.9% 19.1% -7.9% 18.8% 
Source: USITC personal communication 
 
The initial beneficiaries of the 2006 US safeguards were Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Cambodia. January to June 2006 saw volume increases on the 
comparable 2005 period of 19.62%, 27.40%, 19.92% and 31.22%, and value 
increases of 26.54%, 30.40%, 27.37% and 29.93% respectively. In addition, round-
tripping was evidenced by rebound shipments through Hong Kong and Macau which 
increased by 24.66% and 43.98%, and 24.22% and 45.86%, in volume and value 
terms respectively (Emerging Textiles 2006).  However, some of these trends were 
not sustained for the whole year (Table 6) below. Bangladesh, for instance, saw full 
year net volume and value increases of 3.44% and 6.49%. Volume and value 
changes for other countries for the same period were recorded as follows: Indonesia 
(5.04% and 8.47%), India (3.28% and -0.53%), Cambodia (2.84% and 13.53%) and 
El Salvador (12.24% and 5.57%) (OTEXA 2008). Imports from Hong Kong and 
Macau for the year fell by 31.56% and 14.27% in volume, and 31.74% and 14.61% in 


















World 22,539.24 23,332.11 3.52 71,629.83 73,922.59 3.20 100% 
China 6,506.08 8,033.59 23.48 18,517.64 22,745.02 22.83 30.77 
Mexico 1,477.17 1,210.46 -18.06 5,297.11 4,523.37 -14.61 6.12 
                                                
12 We are grateful for input and the data in Table 2 from Robert Koopman and Kimberlie Freund of the USITC. 
In 2005 Nathan and Associates interviewed the main US retailers in respect of sourcing from AGOA exporters 
as an alternative to China. The importance of spreading risk in their sourcing decisions was a clear critical 




Vietnam 947.37 1,273.67 34.44 3,222.05 4,358.51 35.27 5.90 
Indonesia 1,013.16 1,064.25 5.04 3,670.30 3,981.07 8.47 5.39 
India 840.30 867.89 3.28 3,186.89 3,169.93 -0.53 4.29 
Bangladesh 1,306.92 1,351.83 3.44 2,914.09 3,103.35 6.49 4.20 
Cambodia 842.72 866.62 2.84 2,135.89 2,424.94 13.53 3.28 
Hong Kong 523.34 358.20 -31.56 2,810.98 2,034.78 -16.45 2.75 
Thailand 566.39 522.97 -7.67 1,839.71 1,766.31 -3.99 2.39 
Philippines 589.01 457.90 -22.26 2,002.47 1,722.22 -13.99 2.33 
                             Data Source: OTEXA 
 
Despite quotas, China continued to grow its volume and value share of aggregate US 
apparel imports - currently 34.43% (8.03 billion SME) and 30.77% (US$22.74 billion) 
respectively - albeit at a decelerating rate. Value imports from China in all categories 
grew by 36% in the third quarter of 2006 and 46% in the first half of 2007. When 
averaged across the entire 2006-2007 period, the net change in imports was 23.48% 
and 22.38% in volume and value terms respectively.13 Aggregate US apparel imports 
increased by 3.52% and 3.20% in value and volume terms respectively. Furthermore, 
imports from China in restricted categories continued rising throughout the quota 
period. 
 












332/432/632 Socks 50.95 53.94 
338/339 Cotton knit shirts 41.20 53.56 
340/640 M/B woven shirts 68.50 88.40 
347/348 Cotton trousers 30.29 39.43 
349/649 Brassieres 20.37 4.63 
352/652 Underwear 66.63 76.56 
                                                
13 Whilst a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, preliminary data for the first half of 2008 suggests 
that this situation has changed quite dramatically in the first half of 2008. Imports from China fell by 6.55% 
(volume) and 4.63% (value) on comparable 2007 figures. Furthermore, China lost US market share in 8 of 13 





359/659 Swimwear 15.73 10.42 
443 Wool suits -1.37 6.50 
638/639 MMF knit shirts 27.74 34.78 
345/645/646 Sweaters 73.24 92.59 
647 MMF trousers 35.04 29.38 
847 Silk & veg trousers -13.96 -17.13 
                      Data source: OTEXA 
2.2 Price inWlation and product downgrading  
The second outcome of quantitative restrictions on imports into the US is a shift in 
the direction of higher value-added higher quality products, evidenced by an increase 
in the unit value of imports. This happens because importers striving to maximise 
profits drop low-margin items first when forced to reduce consignments (Edwards et 
al. 2007, Morris and Einhorn 2008). The corollary to this is that domestic 
manufacturers are forced toward low-cost, basic items whilst importers fill the 
demand at the high end of the market. 
 
In the first half of 2006, unit values of apparel imports into the US rose by 1.95% in 
aggregate whilst those from China rose by 4.65% (Emerging Textiles 2007b).  
However, for the full 2006-2007 period, the results are mixed. In aggregate, unit 
values of imports fell by -0.31% as did those from China by -0.53%. However, a 
detailed analysis of unit values in quota categories broadly confirms the theory of 
price inflation (Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Changes in unit values in US quota categories: 2006‐2007 
  Aggregate imports China imports 








332/432/632 Socks 1.38 -5.05 1.28 1.98 
338 Cotton knit shirts 5.51 1.67 10.79 12.63 
340/640 M/B woven shirts 3.56 4.14 3.53 11.81 
347/348 Cotton trousers 4.60 -3.22 5.36 7.01 
349/649 Brassieres 9.80 -4.14 7.83 -13.07 
352/652 Underwear 1.22 -1.10 1.35 5.96 
359/659 Swimwear 1.42 -0.59 1.24 1.46 
443 Wool suits 22.47 4.17 10.89 7.97 




345/645/646 Sweaters 2.58 3.49 2.61 11.17 
647 MMF trousers 3.77 0.38 5.34 -4.19 
847 Silk & veg trousers 4.47 -1.97 4.20 -3.68 
                                       Source: Emerging Textiles 2008c 
 
In nine of the thirteen quota categories, unit values from China increased between 
2006 and 2007; in the most sensitive categories (those with high fill rates), such as 
woven shirts, cotton trousers and sweaters, these increases were up 12.8%. In the 
remaining three quota categories, unit values from China fell by between 4 and 13% 
for the comparable period (OTEXA 2008).  Unit values from China across all quota 
categories included in the calculation increased by 3.43%14 compared with a 0.73% 
increase in aggregate values between 2006 and 2007.15 Where unit values from 
China have fallen, for instance in the case of brassieres, this may be due to excess 
supply in China from U.S. buyers switching to alternative sources as a result of 
safeguards, in this case, Bangladesh.  
 
In addition, aggregate price increases were evident for most emerging supplier 
countries as well. Full year increases of between a half and 10% were recorded for 
eight of the nine alternative sourcing locations, such as Mexico (4.21%), Bangladesh 
(2.96%), Indonesia (3.26%) and Vietnam (0.62%) as well as Cambodia (10.40%) 
(OTEXA 2008). This implies that US manufacturers are being generally forced 
toward production of basic, low unit value items.  
 
CASE STUDY: Restrictions on Imports of “Baby Socks” from China into USA 
Objections against quantitative restrictions on imports of certain baby socks and booties 
in terms of quotas on hosiery (category 332/432/632) prompted an investigation by the 
USITC into the probable effect of their removal. The report concluded that the removal of 
BSB1 - socks with bulky embellishments which preclude them from being worn as 
footwear - from the quota would likely have a negligible effect on the level of imports of 
baby socks and booties from China on total US imports of baby socks and booties and on 
domestic producers of baby socks and booties. This is because the product imported 
under this definition constituted a product for which there was no US production.  With 
respect to BSB2 - socks with embellishments - the commission upheld the restrictions 
despite significant anecdotal evidence that the quotas had simply led to higher unit prices 
                                                
14 No part categories were included in the calculation due to lack of information. 
15 A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the current report but preliminary data released by OTEXA suggests 




with no increase in domestic orders. This is because importers had either procured 
additional quota early when quota costs were at their highest or switched to higher cost 
foreign suppliers including South Korea, Taiwan and Cambodia. Import restraints 
therefore remain despite evidence that i) increased costs associated with purchasing 
quota or changing suppliers are passed onto consumers and ii) any domestic loss in 
sales of BSB2 would likely affect sales of other baby socks since BSB2 are mostly sold 
as part of an assortment that includes other baby socks even though they alone account 
for a relatively small share of total imports of baby socks.  
 
 
The above case study demonstrates the inherent problem with interventions that 
paint with a broad brush. Firstly, the quota net may be cast too wide with the result 
that it catches products that do not require restrictions but whose limitation disrupts 
the local market. Government officials are often incapable of appreciating the 
broader supply chain effects of restrictions on product categories. More importantly, it 
also demonstrates that quotas may not altruistically benefit local manufacturers but 
will more likely lead to supplier substitution where the product is sourced from 
alternative foreign locations at a higher cost.  
 
In conclusion, whilst safeguards have at best only managed to put the brakes on 
China’s import growth, they have also encouraged importers to prematurely identify 
alternative foreign sources of clothing, the effect of which will endure beyond the 
restrictions. From an output perspective quantitative restrictions have encouraged 
importers toward high unit value items with accompanying greater margins leaving 
local manufacturers to satisfy the low value end of demand.  
 
3. South Africa: What the industry said would happen… 
Restrictions were imposed on 31 tariff lines with 82 product categories affected: 11 at 
HS 4, 63 at HS 6 and 8 at HS 8 level. Not all are in the generally recognised clothing 
categories of Chapters HS61 and HS62, but also in fabrics (HS52, 55 and 60) and 
one in curtains (HS63). These lines accounted for 65.81% of 2007 aggregate clothing 
imports. The criteria governing the selection of these exact lines are far from clear. 
However, Sandrey and Jensen (2007) conclude that since only six of the lines that 
received quotas showed growth rates that exceeded the growth of clothing imports 





At the time of implementation, the industry emphatically rejected the DTI’s proposal 
that quotas would promote employment and encourage firms to commit to and 
engage in meaningful reform. Instead a series of quite contrary outcomes were 
anticipated. To put the quotas into context, Clotrade (2007) observed that without 
making provision for growth in demand, the shortfall between 2006 imports in 
restricted categories and the 2007 quota implied that 172.9 million garments and 5.6 
million kilos of wearing apparel16 had to be sourced from local manufacturers or 
alternative countries to China at short notice. If this quantity were produced locally, 
60,000 additional jobs would be created, which given the 2006 level of 74 600 
employees, meant that the industry would have to double its capacity and rejuvenate 
the skills pool which has been haemorrhaging since 2003.  
 
Industry stakeholders and experts hypothesized that quotas would:- 
 
• Lead to import diversion with no serious net fall in imports: The experience of 
the United States shows that import restrictions on Chinese goods would not 
unequivocally lead to substitution for local goods. A more likely occurrence 
was that retailers would simply secure alternative, and possibly lower cost, 
foreign suppliers. In the short run at least, it was expected that countries 
where contracts already existed would benefit, such as India, with suppliers 
casting an ever widening net toward other Asian countries. Brink (2006) 
showed that half of the increase in textiles imports between 2000 and 2004 
was already from suppliers other than the Chinese.  
 
• Push local manufacturers down the value chain to low value-added goods. In 
order to optimize their competitive advantages of location, flexibility and speed 
to market, domestic manufacturers were advised to focus production efforts on 
high end disposable fashion items rather than compete with China in low end 
mass produced items. However, as observed in the United States, quantitative 
restrictions imply that importers graduate to high end products to maximize the 
net worth of their import basket which has the opposite effect of pushing local 
producers down the value chain (Bisseker 2006b). 
                                                
16 In January to December 2006, 345.1 million garments (71% of total unit imports from China) and 9.4 million 
kilos (48% of total kilo imports from China) were imported in restricted categories. The 2007 quotas in these 





• Encourage trans-border shipments, illegal activities and increase the 
number of imports declared under incorrect codes (Bisseker 2006b). In 
particular, the overly restrictive nature of the quotas and the short notice for 
implementation would increase attempts at transshipments and add to the 
already substantial level of illegal activity evidenced by gross undervaluations 
of imports (Clotrade  2007a; Sandrey and Van Eeden 2007, Morris and 
Einhorn 2008). Given the lack of capacity of SARS and the ITAC to monitor 
border activity and verify rule-of-origin violations, Chinese goods would 
continue to enter South Africa through other SADC countries (Sandrey 2006). 
 
• Lead to supply shortages and supply chain bottlenecks - relating mainly to 
fabric restrictions, and quota on fabric not domestically produced. 
 
• Be ineffective as an intervention to promote the competitiveness of the 
industry. It was argued that promoting systemic competitiveness required 
encouraging individual firms to upgrade their production capabilities, and 
facilitating a strategic collaboration between sectors and enterprises. 
 
• Fail to create jobs and sustainably raise employment in the industry (Edwards 
and Morris 2007). This is obviously critical as it is a key claimed objective.  
 
• Create welfare problems through raising the cost of clothing and reducing 
the disposable income of the poor (Bisseker 2006b, Hazelhurst 2006a, Morris 
2007, Morris and Einhorn 2008). 
 
The discussion that follows is guided by addressing the following key questions:- 
  
1. What has happened to imports in the restricted categories? And, what has 
happened to imports overall? 
 
2. What has happened to employment since the restrictions were imposed?  
 
3. What has happened to domestic production and domestic demand in the first 
nine months of this year?  
 
4. What has happened to competitiveness and innovation in local firms? Have 





5. What has happened to price and by inference, what has been the consumer 
welfare impact of quotas?  
 
4. Comparison of trade in quota and non quota imports 
Since the majority of lines subject to restriction fall under the tariff headings for 
clothing, the following sections limit analysis to trade under the two main tariff 
headings of HS61 and HS62. The discussion proceeds with an overview of import 
activity in aggregate imports, and quota and non quota categories. It concludes with 
analysing the implications for import diversion and local manufacturing.  
 
4.1 Aggregate clothing imports: 2006­2007 
Between January and December 2007, total and quota clothing imports from 
China fell by R1,518.53m (28.02%)17 and R1,937.78m (50.10%) respectively. Table 
8 below tracks the progressive decline in imports from China by cumulative quarters 
during 2007. At the same time, some countries which had never featured heavily in 
the past made dramatic inroads into the South African market. 
 
Table 9: Quota imports from China (Rm): 2007 by cumula>ve quarters 
 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 Q42007 
World 4,741.58 682.51 1,394.00 2,491.35 3,595.03 
China 3,857.47 439.32 839.48 1,421.37 1,955.49 
China % 2006 100% 65.03% 60.86% 57.74% 47.74% 
% market share 81.35% 64.37% 60.22% 57.05% 54.39% 








































6th place Italy Indonesia Indonesia Malawi  Malawi 
                                                
17 This is the figure according to customs import data. However, numerous arguments are presented in Section 
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         Data source: Clotrade        Own calculations 
 
4.1.2 Major percentage and monetary gainers 
 Table 9 (below) shows major percentage and monetary gainers in clothing imports 
as a whole in 2007. Despite expectations that India would be a major beneficiary of 
quotas (Clotrade 2007a), it has been consistently outperformed in both percentage 
and monetary terms by a host of other emerging supplier countries including 
Mauritius, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam18. Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and 
Bangladesh have achieved also gains of approximately 100% or more compared with 
the same 2006 period19. As of December 2007, Malaysia was the principle 
beneficiary of quotas having achieved more than 1000% growth in value terms and 
an even more impressive 8000% in volume terms in 2007. Volumes increased from 
238,000 units in 2006 to 19.26 million units in 2007 of which 81% (R15.62 million) 
were under quota (Clotrade 2007b). 
 
Table 10: Major percentage and monetary gainers in aggregate clothing imports 
Major Percentage movers Major value movers 
Rank Country % 
change 
Rank Country Value 
change 
 World -8.58  World -591.91 
 China -27.92  China -1,512.12 
1. Madagascar 4823.54 1. Indonesia 111.96 
2. Malaysia 1092.84 2. Mauritius 110.71 
                                                
18 A recent research report suggests that some of this growth may be due to the establishment of Chinese clothing 
firms in some of these Asian countries in response to (mainly) US safeguards  (Emergingtextiles, 2008). 
19 Some Swaziland firms have coped by taking advantage of the China quotas and switched to exporting to South 
Africa. However, because Swaziland belongs to the South African Customs Union, the magnitude of these 




3. Myanmar 444.17 3. Malaysia 103.20 
4. Sri Lanka 381.99 4. Bangladesh 90.67 
5. Macao 374.55 5. Vietnam 84.44 
6. Vietnam 341.03 6. India 81.19 
7. Indonesia 232.66 7. Myanmar 78.55 
8 Cambodia 198.99 8. Hong Kong 69.62 
9 Bangladesh 178.35 9. Thailand 37.74 
10 Zimbabwe 85.13 10. Zimbabwe 37.43 
11 Mauritius 76.59 11. Turkey 27.56 
12 Thailand 59.62 12. Sri Lanka 27.27 
13 Turkey 54.99 13. Madagascar 23.61 
14 Tunisia 53.07 14. Cambodia 23.60 
15 Hong Kong 36.86 15. Macao 12.15 
16 Romania 30.40 16. Italy 8.10 
17 India 29.26 17. Pakistan 6.27 
18 Pakistan 24.50 18. Tunisia 5.71 
19 France 16.35 19. United States 5.35 
20. United States 15.92 20. Romania 4.65 
21. Italy 10.64 21. France 4.41 
22. Republic of Korea 9.84 22. Republic of Korea 0.42 
23. Taiwan -1.29 23. Taiwan -0.26 
24. Philippines -4.86 24. Philippines -0.54 
25 Germany -5.55 25 Germany -0.75 
                         Source: Quantec 
 
4.2. Quota versus non­quota clothing imports 
The analysis here decomposes aggregate imports into imports in quota and non 
quota lines. The objective is to compare quota lines trade with that in non-quota lines. 
This will be done in three ways: First, on an aggregate basis. Second, by unit and 
kilogram categories. Third, by HS categories. These distinctions are prompted a) by 
the diverse behaviours of unit and kilo imports within quota and non quota cohorts 
and b) due to the disproportionate share of quota lines in the different clothing 



















Figure 3 (above) shows that between 2000 and 2006, World imports in quota lines 
steadily increased by 443.50% and 342.49% in value and volume terms respectively. 
Similarly, World imports in non-quota lines increased by 409.19% and 364.70%, in 
value and volume terms respectively, during the same period.  After 2006, however, 
the trends in quota and non quota imports diverge; whereas quota imports fall in both 
value (-24.54%) and volume (-50.07%) terms, non quota imports continued to grow 
by 26.47% (value) and 26.47% (volume) between 2006 and 2007. The divergence of 
the value and volume indices 2006 and 2007 indicate rising prices in quota 
categories and falling prices in non-quota categories. At least some of the divergence 
is likely due to much hypothesised under-invoicing by importers to avoid duty or 
misdeclarations under incorrect tariff codes to sidestep quantity restrictions. 
Ironically, pre-quota this was a problem which was more readily attributed to kilogram 





Table 11 and Table 13 contain base data for HS61 and HS62 imports for the entire 
Chapter as well as quota and non-quota categories for Jan–Dec 2007. Comparable 
2006 data is also shown, as are percentage changes.  Total imports are decomposed 
under the two main tariff headings for clothing, namely HS61 (knits) and HS62 
(wovens).  The data is ranked by quota imports expressed in values.  
4.2.1 HS Chapter 61 
Table 11 introduces the examination, starting with HS61 imports.  
 
Table 11: South African imports of HS61, knided apparel from Jan‐Dec 2007 
Country Total H61 imports H61 quota imports H61 non-quota imports 












World 2939.69 -0.92 919.05 -27.88 2020.64 19.37 
China 1906.33 -16.70 481.51 -54.68 1424.82 16.21 
India 182.63 62.49 98.71 104.20 83.93 31.02 
Mauritius 168.74 73.85 42.53 462.59 126.21 41.01 
Myanmar 57.49 325.69 43.57 737.80 13.92 67.59 
Malaysia 53.96 979.58 40.44 3109.54 13.52 261.74 
Indonesia 60.46 235.72 37.12 319.52 23.34 154.76 
Hong Kong 76.91 -6.36 35.42 42.42 41.50 -27.54 
Thailand 52.55 75.99 25.86 98.12 26.70 58.81 
Bangladesh 55.44 95.68 17.98 129.80 37.47 82.66 
Turkey 40.15 78.50 14.09 139.54 26.06 56.88 
Vietnam 26.95 99.89 12.10 93.93 14.85 105.02 
Malawi 15.90 -76.21 7.84 -77.22 8.06 -75.14 
Italy 29.48 -1.25 6.33 -1.33 23.15 -1.22 
Sri Lanka 13.16 174.80 4.34 329.28 8.82 133.49 
Cambodia 25.79 170.17 4.15 207.50 21.64 164.01 
United States 20.45 30.46 3.62 38.12 16.84 28.92 
France 12.45 22.90 3.43 30.94 9.02 20.10 
Pakistan 13.90 -10.26 1.92 -40.36 11.98 -2.36 
Taiwan 10.65 -9.73 1.63 -49.05 9.03 4.85 
Portugal 8.26 92.95 1.24 59.85 7.02 100.28 
Madagascar 12.67 2654.15 0.46 2621.47 12.21 2655.39 
Zimbabwe 2.49 32.05 0.22 -47.14 2.28 53.98 





In 2007, total HS61 imports from China fell by 16.70%. Global HS61 imports also fell, 
although by only a marginal 0.92%. In value terms, this constituted a fall of R27.38m 
and R382.23m in World and Chinese imports respectively. In contrast, India and 
Mauritius showed sizeable percentage increases of 62.49% and 73.85%, or 
alternatively, of R70.24m and R71.68m in value terms respectively. The largest 
percentage gainers were Madagascar (2654.15%), Malaysia (979.58%), Myanmar 
(325.69%), Cambodia (170.17%), Indonesia (235.72%), Vietnam (99.89%) and Sri 
Lanka (174.80%) although all off a low base. These countries were also the greatest 
gainers in value terms; Malaysia (48.96m); Myanmar (43.98m); Indonesia (42.45m); 
Bangladesh (27.11m) and Thailand (22.69m). The greatest losers in value terms 
were Malawi (-50.95m), United Kingdom (-5.24m) and Hong Kong (-5.22m). These 
countries were also the greatest percentage losers; Malawi (-76.21%); Hong Kong (-
6.36%), United Kingdom (-42.59%).along with Pakistan (-10.26%), Germany (-
17.07% and Korea (-12.35%) off a lower base.  
 
Quota imports 
In the quota lines of HS61, overall imports fell by 27.88% as did imports from China 
in these lines by 54.68%. This translates into a fall in value terms of R355.31m and 
R580.97m for the World and China respectively. Conversely, imports from India 
(104.20%), Malaysia (3109.54%), Myanmar (737.80%), Indonesia (319.52%) and 
Mauritius (462.59%), increased significantly as did those from Sri Lanka (329.28%), 
Vietnam (93.93%), Turkey (139.54), Cambodia (207.50%) and Madagascar 
(2621.47%) off a lower base. In value terms, India saw the greatest gain of R50.37m, 
followed by Malaysia (R39.18m), Myanmar (R38.37m), Mauritius (R34.97m), 
Indonesia (R28.27m) and Thailand (R12.81m). The greatest loser in value terms was 
Malawi (-R26.58m), also the greatest percentage loser (-77.22%), along with 
Zimbabwe (-47.14%), United Kingdom (-46.65%), Pakistan (-40.36%) and Germany 
(-38.54%). 
  
Non-quota imports  
In non-quota lines of HS61, overall imports increased by 19.37% as did imports from 
China in these lines by 16.21%. Positive value increases were also registered by all 
other major import countries, but generally lower than increases in quota lines. 




experience decreases in imports in both value and percentage terms were Malawi (-
75.14%; -R24.36m), Hong Kong (-27.54%; -R15.77m), United Kingdom (-41.34%;-
R3.96m) and Germany (-11.73%; R0.38m). The increase in Hong Kong imports in 
quota lines coupled with the fall in non quota lines may evidence much anticipated 
“round-tripping” or ‘trans-shipment’ where imports from China are funneled through 
Hong Kong into South Africa.   
 
Table 11 below shows country rankings for comparable 2006 and 2007 periods  
 
Table 11: Leading suppliers of South African imports of HS61, knided apparel 2006‐2007 
Total H61 imports H61 quota imports H61 non-quota imports 
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 
2. India 2. India 2.  India 2. India 2. Mauritius 2. Mauritius 
3. Mauritius 3. Mauritius 3. Malawi 3. Myanmar 3. India 3. India 
4. Hong Kong 4. Hong Kong 4. Hong Kong 4. Mauritius 4. Hong Kong 4. Hong Kong 
5. Malawi 5. Indonesia 5. Thailand 5. Malaysia 5. Malawi 5. Bangladesh 
6. Thailand 6. Myanmar 6. Indonesia 6. Indonesia 6. Italy 6. Thailand 
7. Italy 7. Bangladesh 7. Bangladesh 7. Hong Kong 7. Bangladesh 7. Turkey 
8. Bangladesh 8. Malaysia 8. Mauritius 8. Thailand 8. Thailand 8. Indonesia 
9. Turkey 9. Thailand 9. Italy 9. Bangladesh 9. Turkey 9. Italy 
10.Indonesia 10 Turkey 10. Vietnam 10. Turkey 10. US 10. Cambodia 
 
4.2.2 HS Chapter 62 
The data in Table 13 shows a similar pattern. Although the value of imports in both 
clothing Chapters are comparable for the Jan to Dec 2007 period, 2939.69(HS61) 
versus 3368.41(HS62), there is a big difference in the relative shares of quota and 
non quota lines in the respective Chapters. Imports in HS62 are heavily concentrated 
in quota categories. During 2006, quota lines comprised 86.84% of total HS62 
imports. During 2007 this was reduced but to a still high 79.44%. 
 
Table 13: South African imports of HS62, woven apparel from Jan‐Dec 2007 
Country Total H62 imports H62 quota imports H62 non-quota imports 















World 3368.41 -14.35 2675.98 -22.82 692.43 48.68 
China 1997.11 -36.13 1473.98 -47.26% 523.14 57.56 
Hong Kong 181.55 70.13 165.74 79.09 15.82 11.61 
India 175.98 6.63 130.15 6.55 45.86 6.68 
Malawi 99.69 28.54 96.60 27.11 5.25 22.57 
Indonesia 66.61 280.83 90.99 254.49 9.57 98.78% 
Bangladesh 86.06 282.45 83.54 307.05 2.53 22.66 
Mauritius 86.52 82.18 82.53 78.24 4.00 202.23 
Zimbabwe 78.91 87.50 78.78 88.12 1.09 28.06 
Vietnam 82.25 629.31 76.22 736.13 6.35 124.84 
Malaysia 58.68 1220.19 50.04 1928.94 8.64 336.79 
Italy 54.81 18.30 46.21 15.03 8.60 39.62 
Thailand 48.48 45.01 38.96 57.60 9.53 9.28 
Myanmar 38.74 826.88 38.02 989.10 0.73 5.53 
Turkey 37.54 35.85 32.19 70.71 5.35 -39.04 
Sri Lanka  21.24 804.36 19.68 849.75 1.57 465.43 
Pakistan 17.97 77.75 15.41 150.69 2.56 -35.31 
France 18.93 12.41 14.74 1.33 4.20 82.27 
Romania 15.86 40.08 13.11 19.05 2.76 769.13 
United States 18.52 3.23 11.85 -3.89 6.67 18.86 
Tunisia 11.01 49.35 10.62 45.66 0.39 388.68 
Cambodia 9.67 317.89 9.12 351.81 0.56 87.44 
Madagascar 11.42 38822.76 8.82 61964.33 2.61 17114.36 
            Data source: Quantec        Own calculations 
 
Total Chapter 62 imports 
Overall imports in HS62 fell by 14.35% with those from China down by an even larger 
36.13%. These percentages translate into significant value decreases of R1, 
129.89bn and R564.53bn for China and the World respectively. These values are 
notably larger than those for Chapter H61. Conversely, imports from India and Hong 
Kong, the second and third largest suppliers were up by 6.63% and 70.13% 
respectively (almost all in quota lines), as were imports from all other major suppliers 
(also mainly in quota lines). The increase for Hong Kong was contrary to the 
experience of HS61 but not unexpected given that quota is a more important factor in 
HS62. Major percentage gainers included Zimbabwe (87.505), Mauritius (82.18%), 
Indonesia (230.83%) and Bangladesh (282.45%) as well as Vietnam (629.31%), 




base. Although off an even lower base, Madagascar’s gains of 38,822.76% are 
impressive. In value terms, the major gainers were Vietnam (70.98m), Indonesia 
(69.51m), Bangladesh (63.56m), Malaysia (54.24m), Mauritius (39.03m), Myanmar 
(34.47) and Zimbabwe (36.83m). 
 
Quota imports 
In HS62 quota lines, overall imports are down by 22.82% and China’s by a significant 
47.26%. These figures are similar to that of HS61 but the values are higher; -
R791.23 m and -R1321.01m for the World and China respectively. Imports from India 
in these lines rose by a mere 6.55%. Comparatively, Hong Kong, South Africa’s third 
largest import partner in this Chapter in 2006 saw strong growth of 79.09% or 
R73.19m in monetary terms. Other gainers in value terms included Vietnam 
(R67.11m), Indonesia (R65.32m), Bangladesh (R63.01m), Malaysia (R47.57m), 
Zimbabwe (R36.90m), Mauritius (R36.23m) and Myanmar (R34.53m). In percentage 
terms, Mauritius (78.24%), Zimbabwe (88.12%) and Malawi (27.11%) were the major 
gainers. However, consistent with previous analysis, large percentage gains, 
although off a low base came from Malaysia (1928.94%), Vietnam (736.13%), 
Myanmar (989.10%), Indonesia (254.49%) and Bangladesh (307.05%). Once again, 
Madagascar’s gain of 61,964.33% albeit off a very low base is noteworthy. One of 
the greatest loser in both percentage and value terms behind China was 
Mozambique (-62.97% or R7.96m). 
 
Non-quota imports 
Perhaps the most important change of all was recorded in non-quota HS62 imports. 
Overall values increased by nearly 50% (48.68%), a considerably larger percentage 
increase than HS61 (19.37%), although once again the values are lower. In value 
terms, imports in non quota lines rose by R226.70m (versus R327.93m HS61). China 
showed a similar increase in these lines of 57.56% or R191.12m, which marks an 
obvious shift toward non quota line imports. If this growth is sustained, imports in non 
quota lines from China could potentially offset its loss of quota imports in HS62. Non 
quota imports for all other major suppliers increased between 5 - 25%, except 






Table 13 below shows country rankings for comparable 2006 and 2007 periods  
 
Table  13:  Leading  suppliers  of  South  African  imports  of  HS62,  knided  apparel  2006  & 
2007 
Total H62 imports H62 quota imports H62 non-quota imports 
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 
2. India 2. Hong Kong 2.  India 2. Hong Kong 2. India 2. India 
3. Hong Kong 3. India 3. Hong Kong 3. India 3. Hong Kong 3. Hong Kong 
4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Turkey 4. Thailand 
5. Mauritius 5. Indonesia 5. Mauritius 5. Indonesia 5. Thailand 5. Malaysia 
6. Italy 6. Mauritius 6. Zimbabwe 6. Bangladesh 6. Italy 6. Indonesia 
7. Zimbabwe 7. Bangladesh 7. Italy 7. Mauritius 7. United States 7. Italy 
8. Thailand 8. Vietnam 8. Indonesia 8. Zimbabwe 8. Indonesia 8. United States 
9. Indonesia 9. Zimbabwe 9. Thailand 9. Vietnam 9. Taiwan 9.Vietnam 
10.Turkey 10 Malaysia 10. Bangladesh 10. Malaysia 10. Pakistan 10. Turkey 
 
4.2.3 Ratio of quota to non­quota imports 
Data from Table 11 and Table 13 are reproduced in Table 14 as ratios of quota 
imports to non quota imports allowing changes in the composition of total imports to 
be easily identified.  
 
Table 14: Ra>o of HS61 and HS62 quota to non‐quota line imports 
Country Chapter HS61 Chapter HS62 
 2006 2007 2006 2007 
World 0.75 0.45 6.86 3.58 
China 0.87 0.34 7.32 2.48 
India 0.75 1.18 4.96 4.85 
Myanmar 0.63 3.13 5.06 34.60 
Mauritius 0.08 0.34 45.31 22.86 
Malaysia 0.34 2.99 1.16 5.73 
Hong Kong 0.43 0.85 6.30 9.44 
Indonesia 0.97 1.59 5.27 9.42 
Thailand 0.78 0.97 2.78 4.04 




Vietnam 0.86 0.81 3.12 11.96 
Bangladesh 0.38 0.48 9.95 33.03 
Malawi 1.06 0.97 17.12 18.00 
Italy 0.27 0.27 6.37 5.37 
Sri Lanka 0.27 0.49 6.53 10.86 
France 0.35 0.38 6.30 3.39 
Cambodia 0.16 0.19 6.77 16.38 
Zimbabwe 0.28 0.10 48.26 71.13 
Pakistan 0.26 0.16 1.37 5.64 
 
 
Chapter 61  
Non-quota imports, which have always dominated imports in HS61, increased their 
share to 68.74% from 57.05% the previous year. Quota imports comprised 31.26% of 
aggregate imports in HS61, down from 42.95% in 2006. At an aggregate level, the 
ratio of quota imports to non quota imports fell from 0.75:1 to 0.45:1, confirming the 
slight overall shift away from quota line and toward non-quota line imports identified 
above and a shift of similar magnitude in the same direction for China. In 2007 
imports in non quota lines made up 74.74% of all HS61 imports from China 
compared with 53.57% in 2006 (not shown). The percentage share in aggregate 
imports of quota lines from China fell to 25.26% in 2007 from 46.43% in 2006. 
Comparatively, India, Mauritius, Myanmar and Indonesia increased their ratio of 
quota to non quota imports.  
 
Chapter 62 
As mentioned previously, quota imports comprised 78.18% of total imports in this 
Chapter in 2007, down from 87.28% in 2006. However, despite the minority share of 
imports in non quota lines - 21.82% - this was double the 2006 figure of 12.72%. The 
fall in the ratio from 6.86:1 to 3.58:1 confirms that in 2007, HS62 quota imports have 
fallen relative to HS62 non-quota imports. At an individual country level, the shift 
toward non-quota imports is particularly evident for China where the ratio of restricted 
to non-restricted imports has fallen from 7.32:1 to 2.48:1. That is, for unit every non 
quota imports, there were only 2.48 units of quota imports in 2007 which is less than 
half the 7.32 units for 2006.  As a percentage share in total HS62 imports from China, 




country which showed a significant shift in this direction i.e. toward non-quota lines 
was Mauritius. In 2007 only 22.86 units of quota imports were imported from this 
region for every unit of non quota imports, almost half of the 45.31 units in 2006. 
Interestingly, most European Union countries i.e. Romania, UK, Italy and France as 
well as the US also showed a marked shift away from quota line imports in 2007. 
 
The opposite trend is apparent for most other individual countries i.e. there was a 
majority shift toward quota lines demonstrated by an increase in percentage share of 
quota imports in individual country aggregate imports. This is especially evident for 
the emerging Asian countries; Malaysia (53.67% to 85.14%), Vietnam (75.72% to 
92.28%), Pakistan (57.84% to 84.95%), Thailand (73.52% to 80.16%), Cambodia 
(87.12% to 94.24%) and Bangladesh (90.87% to 97.06%) but also for Hong Kong, 
Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. Hong Kong increased its share of quota line imports to 
90.42% and Madagascar its share 77.18% compared with 48.40% in 2006 (not 
shown). As discussed, this raises questions about the possibility of trans-shipments. 
Increases from Zimbabwe are difficult to explain in general (Sandrey and Van Eeden 
2007). The migration toward imports in restricted categories by Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand is consistent with findings from 
studies in the US that these countries are able to successfully take advantage of 
quota restrictions to their benefit.  Imports in restricted categories comprise a large 
share of total imports from these countries and play a significant role in their overall 
export performance. Clearly this is evidence that South African Chinese quotas, as 







Figure 4 shows quota imports in millions of Rands (in columns on the left hand scale) 
and China’s share of these imports (as a line on the right hand scale).  
Figure 6 shows aggregate imports in millions of Rands (in columns) and China’s 





i) the dramatic decline in quota imports into South Africa from a high of 
R4,754.29m in 2006 to R3,587.62m in 2007 is matched by an equally 
dramatic fall in the percentage of China in these imports from 81.35% in 




iv) Figure 4); and  
v) whilst aggregate imports into South Africa declined from R6,902.78m in 2006 
to R6,304.87m in 2007, so too did China’s share in these imports from 
78.5% in 2006 to 61.86% in 2007. As far as quotas on clothing are 
concerned, if the objective was to reduce China’s participation in quota 
imports and overall imports, this analysis suggests that quotas have to 













               Data source: Clotrade 
 
Figure 8 below magnifies the trends elaborated above into quarterly increments 
between 2005 and 2007. China’s share in both quota line and aggregate imports fell 
sharply between the third quarter of 2006 and the comparable quarter of 2007. 
However, closer scrutiny of trade flows in quota and non quota imports reveals two 
other issues that need to be taken into account. Firstly, an increased flow of imports 
(identified by Clotrade as between 38-42 million units) in the last quarter of 2006 as 
importers hurriedly brought forward 2007 orders and warehoused them instead in 
South Africa. Secondly, increased levels of activity in non quota line imports from 
China in both clothing Chapters.  
 










Figure 9 has non quota imports in millions of Rands (in columns, on left hand scale) 
and China’s percentage share of these imports (as a line, on right hand scale) and 
demonstrates;  
 
i) the sustained growth of non quota imports into South Africa from 2000 
through 2007 and  
ii) the simultaneous qrowth in China’s share in these imports, albeit at a 
decelerating rate (72.20% in 2006 to 72.52% in 2007). This could 
potentially compensate China for the loss of quota imports due to quotas 









               Data source: Clotrade 
4.3. Section summary 
If the objective of quotas was to boost local output, this would require that aggregate 
imports would, at least, remain constant and at best, fall. This in turn would require 
that, i) imports from China in non quota categories did not increase whilst imports in 
quota categories were reduced and, ii) imports from the rest of world in both quota 
and non quota categories did not increase. Findings in previous sections suggest that 
these conditions do not hold.  
 
As shown above in 
Figure 6,          Data source: 
Clotrade 
 and  
Figure 6, overall imports of clothing have not fallen significantly relative to China. 
And, although quota line imports from China fell, non quota line imports increased. 
Furthermore, there has been increased orientation by other major foreign suppliers 
towards quota line imports. This implies that, in line with expectations by industry and 
consistent the US experience, China’s share is simply being reallocated with 
imports being diverted to alternative foreign countries. The next section 
investigates precisely who has got China’s share. 
5. Import diversion: Who has China’s slice?   
An explicit objective of the China quotas was to reduce imports in the restricted 




that shutting out China would simply drive importers towards the proliferation of 
alternative cheap suppliers (Bisseker 2007b). From a supply perspective, the fact 
that many companies have either scaled down or completely closed down in the last 
three years implied that it would be impossible to restore supply capacity at short 
notice (Clotrade 2007a). It was therefore inevitable and immediately obvious to local 
manufacturers that importers would simply look elsewhere, encouraged further by an 
increasingly favorable exchange rate. Table 10 in Section 4.1.2. gave an overview of 
major gainers in percentage and value terms in aggregate clothing imports i.e. both 
restricted and unrestricted categories between January and December 2007 periods. 
China’s share of aggregate clothing imports fell by 27.92% or R1512.12m whilst 
imports for the World fell barely 9%, a monetary value of R591.91m. This implies that 
some of the imports lost to China were allocated to other foreign countries.  
 
The following section investigates precisely who has taken China’s share of clothing 
imports by comparing current import value and market share for individual countries 
for 2007. Table 15 below ranks the current twenty five top countries in terms of 
import share in quota categories. The data is ranked by 2007 sources, expressed in 
values. Changes in percentage and monetary terms between the comparable 2006 
and 2007 periods are also shown.   
 
Table 15: Major players in South African clothing quota categories, 2007 
Rank Country Imports  
 R millions 
% share   % change Value 
change 
R millions 
  2006 2007 2006 2007   
0. The World 4741.58 3595.03 100.00 100.00 -24.18 -1146.54 
1. China 3857.47 1955.49 81.35 54.39 -49.31 -1908.98 
2. India 170.49 228.86 3.60 6.37 34.24 58.37 
3. Hong Kong 117.41 201.15 2.48 5.60 71.32 83.74 
4. Indonesia 34.52 128.11 0.73 3.56 271.16 93.60 
5. Mauritius 53.86 125.06 1.14 3.48 132.19 71.20 
6. Malawi 110.42 104.44 2.33 2.91 -5.42 -5.98 
7. Bangladesh 28.35 101.51 0.60 2.82 258.13 73.17 
8. Malaysia 3.73 90.48 0.08 2.52 2328.13 86.75 
9. Vietnam  15.35 88.32 0.32 2.46 475.4 72.97 
10. Myanmar 8.69 81.59 0.18 0.39 838.74 72.90 




12. Thailand 37.77 64.81 0.80 1.80 71.60 27.04 
13. Italy 46.59 52.54 0.98 1.46 12.77 5.95 
14. Turkey 24.74 46.28 0.52 1.29 87.08 21.54 
15. Sri Lanka 3.08 24.01 0.06 0.67 679.13 20.93 
16. France 17.16 18.16 0.36 0.51 5.85 1.00 
17. Pakistan 9.37 17.33 0.20 0.48 84.97 7.96 
18. United States 14.95 15.47 0.32 0.43 3.47 0.52 
19. Romania 13.31 14.72 0.28 0.41 10.61 1.41 
20. Macao 2.63 13.87 0.06 0.39 427.86 11.24 
21. Tunisia 9.08 13.86 0.19 0.39 52.60 4.78 
22. Cambodia 3.37 13.27 0.07 0.37 293.93 9.90 
23. Madagascar 0.03 9.27 0.00 0.26 29,868.87 9.24 
24 United Kingdom 10.58 8.46 0.22 0.24 -26.98 -3.12 
25 Taiwan 7.16 8.29 0.15 0.23 15.72 1.13 
                                                                         Data source: Quantec             Own calculations 
 
The data in Table 15 is reformatted in Table 16 sorted on i) percentage gains and ii) 
monetary gains between 2006 and 2007. In the first classification (percentage 
change), the biggest gainers were Hong Kong (71.32%), Mauritius (132.19%), 
Bangladesh (258.99%) and Zimbabwe (86.81%) followed by Malaysia (2,408.61%), 
Sri Lanka (682.75%), Vietnam (488.31%) and Indonesia (270.55%) off a lower base. 
Madagascar, in particular, showed impressive growth of 29,383.07% albeit off a very 
low base to secure a place in the top 25 supply countries. However, the table does 
not show the proliferation of countries, which, although off a very low base, have 
achieved significant percentage gains in quota categories and constitute a vast range 
of potential supply sources being sampled by importers. For example; Peru 
(231.91%), Egypt (212.97%), Macedonia (440.13%), Dominican Republic (408.10%), 
Monaco (841.60%), El Salvador (446.34%), Luxembourg (1,755.49%). And,  
Mongolia (18,105.425%), Bahrain (3,323.41%), Costa Rica (701.74%), Zambia 
(795.14%), Tanzania (62,852.66%), Albania (50,470.39%), Cyprus (8,681.38%) and 
Chile (6,990.43%) albeit off an even lower base.  
 
In the second classification (value change), the greatest gainers were Indonesia 
(R93.60m), Malaysia (R86.75m), Hong Kong (R83.74m), Bangladesh (R73.17m), 




In both cases, the data evidences a growing market share for all of South Africa’s 
major clothing suppliers in contrast with Chinas falling share.  
Table 16: Major percentage and value movers in South African clothing quota categories 
 Imports Rand (millions) % share Change ’06-‘07 
Country 2006 2007 2006 2007 % Rand (m) 
Percentage gainers     
1. Madagascar 0.03 9.27 0.00 0.26 9.24 29,868.87 
2. Malaysia 3.73 90.48 0.08 2.52 2,328.13 86.75 
3. Myanmar 8.69 81.59 0.18 2.27 838.74 72.90 
4. Sri Lanka 3.08 24.01 0.06 0.67 679.13 20.93 
5. Vietnam 15.35 88.32 0.32 2.49 475.24 72.97 
6. Macao 2.63 13.87 0.06 0.39 427.86 11.24 
7. Cambodia 3.37 13.27 0.07 0.37 293.93 9.90 
8. Indonesia 34.52 128.11 0.73 3.56 271.26 93.60 
9. Bangladesh 28.35 101.51 0.60 2.82 258.13 73.17 
10. Mauritius 53.86 125.06 1.14 3.48 132.19 71.20 
Value gainers     
1. Indonesia 34.52 128.11 0.73 3.56 271.26 93.60 
2. Malaysia 3.73 90.48 0.08 2.52 2,328.13 86.75 
3. Hong  Kong 117.41 201.15 2.48 5.60 71.32 83.74 
4. Bangladesh 28.35 101.51 0.60 2.82 258.13 73.17 
5. Vietnam 15.35 88.32 0.32 2.49 475.24 72.97 
6. Myanmar 8.69 81.59 0.18 2.27 838.74 72.90 
7. Mauritius 53.86 125.06 1.14 3.48 132.19 71.20 
8. India 170.49 228.86 3.60 6.37 34.24 58.37 
9. Zimbabwe 42.29 79.00 0.89 2.20 86.81 36.71 
10. Thailand 37.77 64.81 0.80 1.80 71.60 27.04 
                                Date source: Quantec       Own calculations 
 
Imports from China in the categories under quota halved to R1,955.49m in 2007, a 
fall of R1,908.98 m or -49.31%. However, in the same period, world imports in these 
categories fell by only half this amount (24.18% in percentage terms and R1,146.54m 
in value terms) to R3,595.03m (Table 15). This is depicted graphically in Figure 11 
which shows that although aggregate imports are trending downwards (represented 
by poly. (World), the decline is less steep than for imports from China (represented 
by poly. (China)). This confirms conclusions in previous sections and other studies 








                                                               Source: Adapted from Sandrey and van Eeden 2007 
  
5. Price discrimination from China   
Table 17 shows import values from China in the twelve main quota categories during 
2007 and the associated change in these values expressed as imports relative to 
2006; 2007 import volumes from China and the relative changes against 2006 
values; and finally average 2007 import prices and the changes relative to 2006 
prices. Imports in these twelve categories comprise 62% and 69% of quota imports 
from China by volume and value respectively. The units of measurement for the 
quantities are mainly given in thousands of units (U) although some are given in 
metric tonnes (kg). 
 
Table 17: Details of South African quota import values, volumes and prices from China 
   Value R(m) Quantity Average price 
R/unit 
HS Description unit 
 
2007 change 2007 change 2007 change 
All quota 1,930.21 -50% 118,813.28 -67% 16.25 49% 
62034200 M&B trousers. 
Not knit. Of 
cotton. 
U 295.04 -32% 12,591.73 -49% 23.43 33% 
62046200 W&G 
trousers. Not 




knit. Of cotton 
6111 Babies 
garments 
kg 183.66 -30% 2,195.08 -41% 83.67 19% 
6205 M&B shirts. 
Not knitted or 
crocheted 
U 157.54 -44% 10,408.03 -61% 15.14 44% 
6206 W&G blouses. 
Not knitted or 
crocheted 
U 116.17 -53% 7,673.78 -68% 15.14 47% 
6105 M&B shirts. 
Knitted or 
crocheted 
U 97.62 -51% 5,404.06 -67% 18.06 50% 
62034300 M&B trousers. 
Not knitted. 
Synthetic fibre 
U 85.60 -50% 6,858.93 -58% 12.48 18% 
6106 W&G blouses. 
Knitted or 
crocheted 
U 78.59 -52% 547.33 -62% 11.16 27% 
621210 Brassieres kg 69.05 -47% 547.33 -56% 126.15 21% 
6201 M&B 
overcoats 
U 53.34 -22% 1,473.86 -45% 36.19 41% 
6202 W&G 
overcoats 
U 50.01 -16% 1,633.58 -54% 30.62 82% 
6108 W&G 
sleepwear 
U 41.68 -57% 20,882.65 -59% 2.00 5% 
       Source: Adapted from Sandrey and Fundira 2008 
 
The average value decline for all imports is 50.10% (50.97% for unit and 43.72% for 
kilogram categories). For the analysed categories, the value range is from a low 16% 
(6202) to 68% (6206) for unit imports and from 29.86% to 46.76% for kilogram 
imports. Due to the different units of measurement, an average volume cannot be 
calculated across all categories but it is possible at a disaggregated level. The 
average volume decline for unit imports is 66.42% and 69.34% for kilogram imports. 
For the analysed categories, the decline ranges from 45.41% to 68.28% for unit 
imports and from 41.90% to 55.90% for kilogram imports. Average prices increased 
by an average of 48.93% for all imports (46.00% for unit and 83.69% for kilo 
categories). The price increases range from 4.53% (6108) to 81.55% (6202).  
 
The above analysis shows that whilst import values from China in quota lines halved 
during 2007, the accompanying fall in import volumes was significantly more than 
proportionate and in some cases more than double the fall in import values (6201, 
6202). This is reflected in rising average prices across the twelve top quota 
categories as shown in Table 17 which may hint at price discrimination on behalf of 




with more systematically in their relation to the welfare impact of quotas in later 
sections. 
5.2 Forward purchasing by retailers 
A second major oversight by the DTI was the failure to anticipate that a delay in the 
implementation of quotas would result in massive buying forward by retailers to 
mitigate the effect of restrictions. According to one firm interviewed: 
 
“There was a total overstocking in the whole retail chain in preparation of quotas. Quota-
wise, retailers got what they wanted in terms of a supply base and local business has not 




Figure 13 below, reproduced from Sandrey and Van Eeden 2007, suggest that 
retailers did considerably step up their level of activity in anticipation of quotas. A 
comparative analysis between first and fourth quarter imports in 2006 and 2007 
clearly shows the announcement of quotas and their subsequent imposition. The 
former is characterised by a sharp increase in quota line imports from China in the 
fourth quarter of 2006 and the latter by a fall in quota line imports in the first two 
quarters of 2007.  Clotrade 2007a estimate that between 38.5 million and 42 million 
garments from China were brought forward from 2007 for delivery in 
November/December 2006 to land before the introduction of quota. Given that the 
shortfall in volume imports from China between June 2006 and June 2007 is 46m 
units, this implies that the real fall in total Chinese imports may be significantly 
distorted (inflated).  In total, 422.7 million units were imported in 2007, down 22.3% 
on 543.9m units in 2006. However, imports of products recorded by weight increased 
from 23 million kilos in 2006 to 24.2 million units (5.2%) in 2007 (Clotrade 2008). 
Once again, although this reflects an overall decline, Clotrade show that once these 
figures are adjusted by the 38.5 to 42 million units brought forward, the net effect is 
an increase of 3-4% year on year in the value of imports and a decline of 7.4%-8.7% 
in unit imports. 
 
This is alternatively shown by a relative comparison of activity in fourth quarter 
Chinese imports in 2006 and 2007 ( 
 
Figure 13); the latter is considerably subdued compared with the former. Finally, the 




the previous outcome that Chinese quota line imports are being displaced by 






                  Data source: Quantec          Own calculations 
 
5.2 Trans­shipment and increased illegal activity 
One of the industry’s greatest concerns was that quotas would entrench the culture 
of illegal import activity (Clotrade 2007a) ranging from mis-declarations of tariff 
codes, under-valuations to avoid import duties and avoiding importer registration 
requirements. Although country-of-origin legislation was recently introduced, SARS 
and UTIC lack the capacity to monitor imports and enforce restrictions on a 
continuous basis. As a result, the potential for transshipment, a global problem driven 
by quotas, was widely foreseen. Certainly there is evidence of round-tripping from 
China through Hong Kong which may also plausibly explain the impromptu rise in 
imports from Zimbabwe since quotas were introduced.  
 
Additional support for under declarations is gained from unit price data. The price 
effects of quotas are examined in detail in section 8. Clotrade (2007a) show that 




from 38,000 to 2 million, a growth of over 5000%. Imports declared under kilograms 
grew from 7,500 kg to 62,000kg, a growth of 726%. Average prices dropped from 
R47.73 in 2006 to R6.72 in 200720. Similarly, imports from Macau grew from R613, 
000 in 2006 to R4.82m in 2007, a growth of 687%. Unit imports grew by 700% (5000 
to 40 000) and kilo imports by 53 025% (32 to 17 000). 
6. Supply bottlenecks 
Supply bottlenecks were widely anticipated. There is significant qualitative evidence 
that quotas have caused significant supply chain disruption and created an extra 
level of inefficiency. This has happened for several reasons.  
 
First, local textiles firms lack capacity to meet local demand, not only in the short 
run, but also in general (Edwards et al 2006).  Firm interviews reveal that the delay in 
implementation, in particular, closed the window of opportunity that quotas were 
supposed to offer local suppliers since importers brought forward many future orders.  
 
Second, the allocation mechanism is flawed. Quota for the next period is based on 
quantity ordered in the current period. Consequently, only those firms who previously 
imported fabric from China in those precise categories under quota were eligible to 
apply for additional quota (Clotrade 2007a, 2008). Given market unpredictability due 
to volatile consumer tastes and frequent fashion changes, it is virtually impossible to 
place future orders based on current demand patterns. As one firm interviewed put it, 
 
“If we have an order on, say, code 6405 for this year, then we get quota for next 
year on this code …. But we may not need it next year because fashions may 
have changed. And the fabric that we do need we can’t get because we didn’t 
order it this year…” 
  
Calculations for quota were based on an 18 month formula spanning one Summer 
and two Winter seasons. Since for most manufacturers 75% of purchases are done 
for Summer, this significantly jeopardized the percentages and created tremendous 
                                                
20 Clotrade in a circular to members in September 2007, make this point very forcibly “Malaysia, coming from a 
position of exporting only 80,000 units to South Africa in 2006, has now passed India to become the second 
largest exporter to South Africa after China in volume terms.  Exports from Malaysia are now 10,4 million units 
at an average price of R5.09 for a total value of only R52,8 million, a 26,000% growth year-on-year.  Even 




imbalance in (fabric) supplies. According to interviews conducted, three areas which 
were hardest hit in terms of reduction in percentage were ironically those which, from 
a retail and consumer perspective, experienced the most significant shifts in demand; 
in particular, woven cotton fabrics 5208 and 5210, as well as knit, 6006. 
Comparatively, too much quota was granted for categories 5514, 6005 and 6006. 
These problems are captured by low utilisation rates of fabric under quota (Table 18). 
 
Table 18: Quota u>lisa>on rate for fabric: 2007 
Period Knit Woven 
  60.05 60.06 52.08 52.09 52.10 56.14 
2007 30.4% 39.1% 71.33% 15.3% 56.2% 55.4% 
                                     Source: Clotrade 2008 
 
Firms use several tactics to get around these restrictions. They may ‘buy’ quota from 
clearing agents at a R3.00 premium per item, irrespective of cost. Or, they may use 
more innovative methods such as applying for quota on behalf of others as new 
entrants, albeit at greater cost or using the quota of their customers. In the first case, 
the flat rate premium provides added incentive to import high cost garments and 
make the cheap one locally with the obvious effect of driving local manufacturers 
down the value chain. Firms also point out that the allocation criteria ironically 
prejudice those who have historically been the most supportive of local industry since 
more quota is granted the greater the quantity imported in the past. Firms who have 
tried to source mainly locally received no quota. Additionally, Clotrade (2007a) 
observes that any new opportunity to produce garments as import replacements is 
excluded to a firm who has not previously imported the specific fabric required for 
those garments should it originate from China.  
 
Third, the scope and design of the restrictions acutely overlook the complexity and 
range of products covered - for example, where there is a quota on the fabric but 
not on the fully made-up garment. The inclusion of fabrics at all in the restrictions is 
problematic. Even firms who have invested in upgrading their plant and workforce to 
be internationally competitive, and should have been ideally poised to benefit from 





This is also the case where manufacturers were importing components to make up 
garments or where manufacturers are also importers and trying to balance their 
bottom line in production by importing high minute rate garments. In anticipation of 
falling prices received from retailers, and hence falling margins on their own products 
in the future, many local clothing firms had recently established or expanded their 
own imported clothing lines in order to maintain profits. 
 
CASE STUDY: FAULTY QUOTA MECHANISMS 
Seven years ago, a large CMT identified a market gap for an underwire bra, which 
requires specific competency. It developed a product line with two bra lines, underwire 
and T-shirt to sell in combination with two of their established underwear lines, the g-leg 
and panty. The firm subsequently landed a contract to supply a large retailer contingent 
on its ability to supply a combination pack which included a padded bra. This latter 
component incorporates seam-free technology which is available exclusively from China. 
The firm began to import padded bras in February 2006. When quotas were introduced in 
January 2007, since they were a new entrant with a historically low import volume of this 
category, the firm was awarded zero quota for padded bras. The quota was awarded 
mainly to one large established company who had previously imported large volumes of 
padded bras. However, since there was a large amount of unallocated quota for panties, 
the firm was awarded substantial quota for this category which it did not need. The firm 
lost its contract with the retailer and had to retrench 15% of its intimate wear workforce, 
the equivalent of 8% of its total workforce. This was the first retrenchment that the firm 
had witnessed in 18 years of operation. For the first six months of this year, solely 
because of quotas, the firm’s average monthly turnover has fallen by 52%. 
                       Source: Morris and Reed 2008 
 
Fourth, lengthy application processes and red tape delay the granting of additional 
quota to firms which prejudices their ability to service their customers’ needs and 
extract future orders from retailers which results in business going to overseas firms.  
 
The Business Alliance (2006) concluded: 
“The China interventions were not based on an impact assessment on prices, quality 
availability or material inputs. Nor based on a detailed analysis of the local capacity to 
produce the necessary product lines specified. Finally, there is no knowledge 
management mechanism in place to ensure the necessary flexibility to deal with 




being locked into a pre-formulated plan and administrative quota allocation mechanism 
without the information feedback to correct the ensuing chaos.”  
7. Employment    
The bold statement that “more than 55, 000 new jobs could be created” by quotas, 
(Acting Deputy Director General, Iqbal Sharma), is unsupported by employment 
trends in the industry. Most studies of employment in the clothing and textile industry 
cite the official Stats SA data. For example, Kriel 2006, uses this data to argue that 
employment dropped from 206 947 in January 2003 to 142 203 in June 2006 (a loss 
of 64 744 jobs). However, as Edwards and Morris 2007 demonstrated, there are 
major problems in using this data source as an indicator of employment trends for the 
clothing and textile sector. For this reason, the following discussion on employment 
draws on data from the National Clothing Bargaining Council and the Textile 
Bargaining Council. This is the most reliable data available, but does not include 
firms who avoid compliance officers' detection, nor those small CMT operations with 
less than five or six workers. Table 19 and Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17 show 
the declining trend in employment and the number of firms in the clothing sector.  
 
Table 19: Total clothing manufacturing firms and employee strengths 2004 ‐ 2007 
 WESTERN CAPE EASTERN CAPE KWAZULU--NATAL NORTHERN AREAS NATIONAL TOTAL 
As at Firms Emply’s Firms Emply’s Firms Emply’s Firms Emply’s Firms Emply’s 
31.03.2004 346 34,130 47 4,673 375 37,077 361     22,659  1,129 98,539 
30.06.2004 345 32,981 45 4,501 371 38,156 367     22,828  1,128 98,466 
30.09.2004 350 33,220 45 4,501 404 39,487 358     21,999  1,157 99,207 
31.12.2004 353 33,508 45 2,715 417 39,715 354 22,020 1,169 97,958 
31.03.2005 362 33,196 47 2,732 421 38,538 347 20,878 1,177 95,344 
30.06.2005 360 31,628 47 2,330 420 36,401 344 19,249 1,171 89,608 
30.09.2005 359 30,896 44 1,427 407 34,627 363 18,473 1,173 85,423 
31.12.2005 346 29,547 43 1,384 396 34,204 353 17,946 1,138 83,081 
31.03.2006 329 28,680 44 1,582 386 32,476 341 15,946 1,100 78,684 
30.06.2006 326 28,375 44 1,462 379 31,977 332 15,034 1,081 76,848 
30.09.2006 325 28,591 44 1,473 370 31,492 326 14,296 1,065 75,852 
31.12.2006 321 28,451 46 1,903 358 30,147 323 13,955 1,048 74,456 
31.03.2007 311 28,369 46 1,930 350 29,846 316 13,467 1,023 73,612 
30.06.2007 307 27,878 48 1,946 348 29,065 312 13,682 1,015 72,571 
30.09.2007 309 28,291 49 2,215 352 29,210 328 13,974 1,038 73,690 
30.11.2007 303 28,114 50 2,512 349 27,750 338 14,207 1,040 72,583 
31.12.2007 302 27,502 50 2,517 348 27,463 338 14,207 1,038 71,689 
 43.14% 47.84% 7.14% 4.38% 49.71% 47.78% 32.56% 19.82% 100% 100% 





NBC data records that in 2007 (the first year of the imposition of Chinese quotas), 
2767 jobs were lost and 10 firms closed down (January to December 2007).  If 
one takes the heartland of the sector (Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal), which 
were supposed to benefit the most from the Chinese quotas, the employment losses 










                                   Source: National Bargaining Council 
Figure 17:  Employment strength by province: 2004 ‐ 2007 
 
                      Source: National Bargaining Council 
 
A 2007 Clotrade survey on employment prospects indicated: whilst 19% of member 
firms intended on increasing staff in the next six months, 15% still intended reducing 
employment whilst 66% intended remaining the same. In particular, the delay in the 




DTI over the China Voluntary Restraint Agreement is accountable for much of the job 
loss between August 2006 and July 2007 (Clotrade 2007b). This is because a Key 
Action Programme in the CSP that proposed the removal of duties on fabric and trim 
would have made a significant contribution to job creation.  
 
The sector specific macro data on the textile industry is unreliable and reliable data is 
hard to come by. There is combined data from STATSSA for the clothing, textile and 
leather sector but, as demonstrated by Edwards and Morris (2007), this is unreliable. 
Nor does the Textile Federation have up to date data either. But a sample of 10 
textile firms that belong to the Cape and KZN Clothing and Textile provides indicative 
but not definitive data on employment trends in the industry. This is reflected in Table 
20 which shows a steady decrease in employment from 2004 -2006 in this sample of 
textile firms, with a marginal increase of 92 employees in 2007. 
Table 20: C&KZN CTC sample tex>le firms employment strength 2004 ‐ 2007 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
4,003 3,656 3,357 3,449 
Source: Cape & Kzn Clothing and Textile Cluster 
 
The statistical results on employment presented above are backed by evidence 
gathered from qualitative interviews with 20 clothing and textiles manufacturers in 
KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape conducted in September 2007. These are 
summarised below. 
 
Since the imposition of quotas, 13% of the firms interviewed have expanded their 
workforce, 40% reported no changes at all, and 47% of firms reported either a 
reduction in the workforce or had put workers on short time, or both. With regard to 
the last group, it is important to note that most of the downsizing was not wholly or 
directly the result of quotas which occurred exclusively in non-core production areas. 
For one firm, it was part of a strategic move to shrink its merchandise design band. In 
the remaining firms, it was largely driven by a consolidation of the management 
function in response to a general downturn of the industry. However, the real impact 
of quotas on employment is better measured by the “opportunity cost” to employment 
– i.e. by estimates of how much employment firms believe they could have created 





“We were growing nicely before quotas and we could have employed more 
people, but the quota on fabric has cut all possibility of increases.” 
 
Even in the two exceptional cases, where the firm has actually expanded its 
workforce, this growth is either not attributed to quotas, 
 
“Our growth is entirely due to our adoption of WCM practices; it is a classic 
product of proper value chain alignment and forging collaborative relationships 
with other stakeholders.” 
 
Or, is expected to reverse once quotas have disappeared.  
 
“The quotas have helped us with our political battle to grow employment, but 
since it has occurred exclusively in an area which competition from Chinese 
imports is most fierce, we cannot guarantee that it will continue once quotas 
go.” 
 
Similar to employment, the quotas have failed to provide a sustained impetus for 
innovation and output growth. Neither have they led to greater competitiveness. 
Clotrade reveals that only 9% of respondents in their survey thought that quotas had 
had a positive impact on their business whilst 31% felt that it had actually hampered 
their business and 60% reported that they had had no impact at all (p.8). If anything, 
quotas have aggravated the situation for clothing manufacturers. This is 
particularly true where restrictions on fabric are linked to unprecedented fabric price 
increases following the announcement of quotas (Clotrade 2007a).  
 
Firm level interviews confirm that, on the whole, the impact from quotas on clothing 
manufacturing firms appears to have been negative in terms of output. Twenty six 
percent of firms interviewed report a contraction of between 20%-40% of output (in 
units).  Forty eight percent report unchanged volumes. This is attributed to a 
complete over-stocking in the retail chain as a result of forward-buying in anticipation 
of quotas, which was widely predicted.  
 
“We were just starting to grow nicely when our whole ability to expand was 
curtailed. In six months, we have shrunk by 30%; not only did we not increase 
orders, but we lost our existing supply base because we couldn’t fill orders. ” 
  
“If not for quotas, we would have had two full production lines with 20 people per 
line. Instead we have seen a 20% drop in output because our design house 





The countervailing view among manufacturers who are hardest hit by quotas is that 
there is no garment that can be made locally that is not available everywhere else in 
the world. This simple fact increases retailers’ bargaining power to the extent that 
pricing has become a unilateral process. Furthermore, 26% of firms believe that 
retailers are not committed to supporting the local industry and will follow the best 
price. They argue that the only benefit to sourcing locally is that retailers have the 
option of stopping production midstream to restyle. However, for this convenience, 
retailers offer no premium, which leaves local firms to compete on the basis of labour 
alone. This is impossible given current constraints imposed by unions on wages and 
working hours. 
 
“We sell labour with the constraints and costs of producing a brand. We design 
a garment, source the fabric and carry all the costs of getting it to market, but at 
the end of the day all that we sell is labour…If we weren’t unionized, we would 
survive. And, if we had a piecework system, our productivity would go through 
the roof, but the bargaining council would shut us down.” 
 
“All we hear now from the retailers is: “We can import this garment at x cost. 
Can you meet it?” They only favour local suppliers for speed to market and 
because they have control over the product which allows them to make changes 
early in the process but all the whiles they are squeezing companies down the 
value chain out of business.” 
 
Twenty percent of firms have historically been supported by local retailers and expect 
this to continue in the future once restraints have been lifted. These firms generally 
produce in those categories that are not under quota. Of those clothing 
manufacturers who have experienced a drop in turnover, this was not exclusively due 
to fabric shortages brought about by quota on fabric, but in two cases, due also to 
quota on fully assembled garments. This reveals a failure of the DTI to acknowledge 
that some manufacturers are also importers who would be negatively impacted by 
quotas. Furthermore, 60% of those firms who are unaffected by fabric shortages 
have experienced a drop in the quality of fabric available from both local and foreign 
suppliers as well as increasingly poor delivery times. This points to mounting 
problems in the supply chain, which cannot be directly addressed by quotas.  
 
Textile firms interviewed, who should be the primary beneficiaries of fabric quotas 
and expected increases of at least 5% due to quotas, reported no significant increase 





There are some exceptions – three firms indicate that local orders have increased in 
the past six months; however, even these cases require qualification. Of the three 
firms concerned, one reported that, although orders had increased, they were very 
low priced and that the substantial talk around orders has generally not translated 
into actual orders. In the second case, the growth is a continuation of a trend that 
preceded the quotas. In the final case, the firm regained a lot of orders lost to 
Chinese competition but regards this as a temporary success and has attributed it to 
the low profitability associated with producing the garment. Furthermore, most of this 
growth was accommodated through outsourcing to CMTs. 
 
A key finding is that all firms, without exception, regard skills to be their greatest 
constraint to growth, not the availability of fabric or the potential to secure orders. 
Precipitately, skills shortages have prevented local manufacturers from exploiting the 
improved bargaining position afforded to them by quotas. Even the most severely 
affected firms believe that a skilled workforce could have mitigated the negative 
impact of quotas. Quotas simply make a bad situation worse. 
7.1 Skills 
Research conducted to assess the impact of quotas on skills provides important 
insights into whether, as a result of quotas, i) firms have increased their skills 
demand which would translate as increased employment and indicate a growing 
supply base, and ii) firms have changed their skills requirements, which would be the 
case if they have changed place in the value chain. The latter also partly addresses 
question of whether firms have been encouraged to innovate and progress to more 
complex garments or whether they are producing basics due to fabric shortages and 
other constraints. The level and composition of demand for skills is therefore an 
important measure of competitiveness.  
 
It is not always possible to isolate changes in skills needs at the firm level but two 
clear patterns do emerge: Firstly, the prophecy that quotas would assist in driving 
firms up the value chain has been largely unfulfilled - there is no significant 
evidence that firms have up-graded to more complex garments. Manufacturing 




local range have simply switched to alternative sources, mainly Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and India. As have the retailers.  
 
Similar to clothing, there is no evidence that the constraints have encouraged 
innovation or investment in textiles. This is an expected outcome given that the 
amortization period on this type of investment is twenty years whilst the quotas have 
a two year window. None of the textile firms in the sample have increased their 
capital investment in the past six months and neither do any have any plans to do so. 
Whilst all of the textile firms have increased their prices in the past six months, this 
has been attributed to rising import costs of chemicals and dyes. 
 
There are only two cases where firms have changed their output mix as a direct 
result of the restrictions. In neither case has the shift been toward more complex, 
higher-end garments, nor is the trend expected to last beyond quotas. Both firms 
concur that they been forced into niche markets in which they will not be competitive 
in an open economy. Both cases demonstrate the unintended consequences of 
quotas for local clothing manufacturers and illustrate how the quota allocation 
mechanism inherently favours firms who historically have been least supportive of 
the local market.  
 
        CASE STUDY 9: TRANSITORY IMPACTS OF QUOTA 
One large clothing firm has significantly expanded its schoolwear division as a direct 
result of quota on “woven shirts” which was sufficient only to cover its customer’s 
requirements for outerwear. In addition to this, the firm has opened a new factory to 
manufacture male underwear; a product which it previously imported and did not make 
locally. This was a strategic decision pre-empted by uncertainty surrounding the 
amount of quota that the firm would be granted as an importer of this product. The 
project has cost billions of Rands and has created 200 new jobs. However, in neither 
case are the gains expected to be sustained once the constraints are lifted. In the latter 
case, in particular, the project is expected to generate a net financial loss to the 
company and the firm anticipates that the employment gains will also be reversed.  





The impact of quotas on price distinguishes two separate effects;  i) the change in 
retail prices and its effect on consumer welfare and ii) the change in producer prices 
and its effect on manufacturers.  
 
Quotas and consumer welfare 
The core issue in any welfare debate is the impact that an intervention has on 
consumers. Sustainable industrial policy is concerned with industrial competitiveness 
on the one hand and welfare on the other (Morris 2007; Morris and Einhorn 2008), 
and the effectiveness of any intervention is measured against how well it balances 
and meets these requirements. The competitiveness focus shies away from strictly 
protectionist measures which seek merely to defend the status quo. It is concerned 
with ensuring long-term sustainability of the sector by altering the ability of firms to 
compete and: i) raising the dynamic production capabilities of individual firms and ii) 
increasing the systemic competitiveness of firms as they interact along the value 
chain. The welfare requirement, is concerned with raising employment in the sector 
and favorably impacting on the consumer basket. The welfare consumption aspect of 
policy is concerned with raising the disposable income of the masses of consumers 
by decreasing the prices of goods in the target sector and thereby increasing the 
standard of living of the mass population. In conclusion, the long term impact of such 
policy should be to incease the competitiveness of labour through the consumption of 
cheaper wage goods which will feed through to lower wage costs across all sectors. 
 
The debate on quotas and consumer welfare centres chiefly on the impact of quotas 
on price and its effect on consumer welfare via consumer retail prices. To determine 
the impact of quotas on welfare, it is important to understand the effect that quotas 
have on import prices and on the local prices of garments generally. Both of these 
issues are dealt with extensively through examining the effect of falling import 
inflation on consumer prices and welfare (Einhorn 2007, Morris and Einhorn 2008) 
primarily in response to the proposition that falling imported inflation is a primary 
source of deflation in some sectors (such as clothing) of the South African economy 
(Hazelhurst 2006a). This is manifest in the divergence of the general CPI which is for 







              Data source: Stats SA 
In sum, deflation in clothing prices between 2000 and 2006 is explained by falling 
import prices and more specifically, import prices from China (Einhorn 2007, Morris 
and Einhorn 2008). This is due to three effects: i) a direct effect from falling FOB 
prices (by approximately 25% during this period); ii) a rise in the share of relatively 
cheaper imports and iii) an indirect effect of falling import prices on clothing prices in 
general since “as imported inflation falls, local producers are forced to compete and 
domestic prices fall into line.” (Hazelhurst 2006a). The main welfare implication is that 
cheap imports imparted significant benefits on consumers both directly, and indirectly 
by suppressing the prices of domestic garments (Morris and Einhorn 2008). Access 
to cheap Chinese imports clearly benefitted consumers and especially those poorer 
consumers at the low end of the market where Chinese imports are concentrated.  
 
A comprehensive analysis of the impact of quotas on consumer welfare requires a 
twofold analysis – a macro analysis of imports, and a sample of retail prices in the 
stores. Such comprehensive data is not yet available and hence we have only 
partially commented on this issue in this report. Figure 19 demonstrates the variation 
between the import CPIs for quota and non quota categories which is due exclusively 







                    Source: Own calculations 
 
This point is more starkly revealed if import prices from China are used to construct 
the indices (Figure 20). Inflation in aggregate FOB prices from China is driven by 








Table 21 (below) summarises the percentage changes in the value, volume and price 
in quota and non quota categories and clearly demonstrates the variation in the 
magnitude of the price change in quota and non quota categories during 2007. Prices 
of quota imports from China increased by 57.20% between 2005 and 2007 (with 
43.21% of this rise between 2006 and 2007 alone) whilst those in non quota 
categories actually fell by 7.99% (falling by 14.44% between 2006 and 2007 after 
rising slightly in 2006). Similarly, between 2005 and 2007, in World quota categories, 
prices increased by 53.60% (45.32% between 2006 and 2007) whilst prices in non-
quota categories fell by 7.18% and by an even greater 13.73% during 2006 and 2007 
after rising slightly between 2005 and 2006. 
 
Table 21: Changes in Dollar denominated FOB prices in quota and non quota categories 
 CHINA WORLD 
 % change 2006-2007 % change 2006-2007 
 Value volume Price value volume Price 
aggregate -30.79 -33.91 4.72 -12.17 -21.16 11.41 
quota -52.02 -66.49 43.21 -27.44 -50.07 45.32 
non quota 22.15 42.76 -14.44 21.62 40.97 -13.73 
                             Source: Own calculations 
 
In conclusion, between 2006 and 2007, the primary source of inflation in the 
clothing CPI is rising prices of quota imports which increased by 45.32% during 
this period. Simultaneously, the prices of non quota imports fell. Since quota imports 
have the dominant value share in aggregate imports in 2007 (57%) the net effect on 
import values would be positive. This is possibly driven by increases in import prices 
from China which rose by 43.21%. The similar magnitude of changes in prices from 
China and World prices suggests that China still drives the latter. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that dollar denominated FOB unit prices from China are gradually 
increasing due to currency revaluations, the weakening of the US Dollar, a reduction 
in export incentives and increased labour demands. However, these factors would 
lead to price increases across the board where only those for quota imports have 
increased. The fact that price inflation is limited to imports in restricted categories 





Even within quota and non quota categories, there is substantial variation in prices 
between unit and kilogram imports. Table 22 summarises changes in unit values - 
denominated in Dollars to exclude the exchange rate effect – in respective quota and 
non quota and unit and kilogram categories for both the World and China.  
 
Table 22: Changes in Dollar denominated FOB prices in unit and kilogram categories 
 All categories Unit categories Kilogram categories 
 % change 2006-2007 % change 2006-2007 % change 2006-2007 
 value volume Price value volume price value volume price 
  CHINA 
Aggregate -30.79 -33.91 4.72 -34.10 -33.91 1.50 -12.41 -5.27 -7.53 
Quota -52.02 -66.49 43.21 -52.85 -66.42 40.39 -45.89 -69.36 76.63 
non quota 22.15 42.76 -14.44 19.65 41.99 -15.73 30.31 53.28 -14.99 
WORLD 
Aggregate -12.17 -21.16 11.41 -15.64 -22.28 8.53 7.73 5.21 2.40 
Quota -27.44 -50.07 45.32 -29.69 -50.14 41.00 -9.26 -47.52 72.91 
non quota 21.62 40.97 -13.73 20.42 40.24 -14.13 25.54 50.88 -16.80 
                       Source: Own calculations 
 
Analysing data at this bare bones level exposes anomalies in the data which hint at 
undervoicing or other irregular import practices. For example, on aggregate (quota 
and non quota categories combined), the price of kilogram imports increased by only 
6% compared with 16% for unit categories with 2% and 8.5% of this increase 
occurring during the quota period. In quota categories, the price of kilogram imports 
rose by 80% compared with 50% for unit categories between 2005 and 2007 with 
73% and 41% of this rise occcurring during the quota period. In non quota 
categories,  the price of kilogram imports fell by 15% between 2005 and 2007 
compared with 5.5% for unit imports for the same period with prices falling by 15% 
and 16% in respective unit and kilogram categories during the quota period. The 
results for China are similar. At the aggregate level, the price of kilogram imports fell 
by  2% (with a fall of 7.53% during the quota period) whilst the price of unit imports 
increased by 13% (1.50% of this rise between 2006 and 2007). In quota categories 
the price of kilogram imports almost doubled (93%) whilst the price of unit imports 
increased by 55.5%. In non quota categories, the price of kilogram imports fell by 
14% compared with 7.5% for unit imports between 2005 and 2007; prices fell by 15% 





The finding that the price of kilogram imports in quota categories from China and in 
aggregate increased is contrary to expectation. One rational explanation is that as a 
result of the quota allocation mechanism which calculates future allowance on the 
basis of past import history, importers are having to adhere more strictly to tariff 
headings and declare items under the correct headings. As a result, prices in these 
categories are rising. This is ironic since in the past kilogram import categories were 
easy targets for underinvoicing practices given that they are more diffiicult to police 
generally containing garments which are small and of great variety. However, the fact 
that prices for non quota kilogram imports are falling may still be due to imports being 
underdeclared as many suspect they are.   
 
The welfare impact of higher import prices depends on several factors. If consumers 
are compensated for the price increases by improvements in garment quality and 
complexity and access to a greater variety of garments, this mitigates (some) of the 
welfare loss associated with decreased spending power. Whilst the price index can 
reliably indicate the direction of price changes, it is unable to comment on the nature 
and quality of garments. Nor is macro-economic price data able to give an accurate 
indication of market trends. It is also impossible to determine from the data whether 
the price increase is due to importers buying more expensive high-end garments or 
whether the prices of existing garments have increased.  
 
However, we have gathered a limited data set to augment the previous analsyis by 
Morris and Einhorn 2008. Although by no means sufficiently comprehensive, higher 
shelf prices of one line of imported basic childrens tracksuit pants, which have not 
changed significantly in quality and/or complexity, suggest that low end consumers 







Morris and Einhorn 2008 for 2004-2006, extended with 2007 data.
      
In summary, in the absence of detailed retail price and product data as used by 
Morris and Einhorn 2008 for the pre quota period, and whilst cautioning against the 
pitfalls and shortcomings of using macroeconomic price data to estimate price trends, 
the following tentative conclusions about the welfare impact of quotas are:  
 
i) the disposable income of consumers is reduced by rising import prices of 
garments in restricted categories. Since the restricted categories are most 
likely those at the low end of the market, this price inflation would more 
than likely impact most on the very poor.  
ii) Anecdotal evidence suggests that substitutes do not match up in quality or 
durability to products to Chinese imports of similar price. By all accounts, 
quotas have reversed the fortuitious position where consumers were 
getting “more spend for their buck”.  
iii) Import restrictions have motivated importers to upgrade their import basket 
and import more high end sophisticated garments which has pushed local 
manufacturers towards supplying the low end of the market where 





Producer prices and manufacturers 
Quotas could potentially impact on manufacturers in two ways:  
 
i) fabric prices and supply bottlenecks leading to shortages (Edwards et al 2006);  
ii)  import prices - both directly and indirectly (by changing the composition of the 
import basket with the result that local manufacturers are forced toward 
supplying the low end of the market). 
The principal challenge facing clothing manufacturers is the pressure on margins, 
which is clearly brought out in the PPI graph below (Figure 22).  Whilst general 
manufacturing continues to do well, climbing rapidly to 11.9%, clothing languishes at 
1.6%, which is simply not enough to ensure new investment in upgrading of 
equipment and technology.  With regard to input costs, clothing firms reported price 
increases from textile mills last September (Clotrade 2007a). Figure 22 indicates a 
sharp improvement in the PPI for Textiles and Spinning and Weaving shortly after the 
announcement of quotas.  As one of the firms interviewed put it: 
 
“After quotas were announced, company ‘X’ Textiles increased their prices on 










                                                                                                                Source: Stats SA 
 
The textile industry claims that it has merely passed on recent increases in chemical 
costs from its overseas suppliers and that retailers continue to squeeze their 
suppliers to barely operable margins. Meanwhile clothing manufacturers find 
themselves in a position of having to absorb increased prices for fabrics but are 
unable to pass on these increased costs in total to retailers.  
 
With regard to the impact of quotas on manufacturers via import prices, the price 
movements from the foregoing analysis are largely in accordance with expectations 
that quotas would bring about a price increase for three reasons; i) quota trading21;  
ii) a higher landed cost of imports, and iii) changes in the composition of the import 
basket. The increased price of imported garments might have provided local 
manufacturers with some margin of competitiveness had the industry been poised to 
exploit this comparative price advantage. Qualitative evidence shows this was not so.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, a well recognised outcome of quantitative restrictions is 
a shift in the direction of higher value-added, higher quality goods because margins 
on these goods are generally higher. Consequently, importers substitute high-end 
expensive garments for cheap basics in order to maximize the profit on their import 
bundle. This appears to be borne out in the data. Aggregate import volumes 
decreased by 22% between 2006 and 2007 whilst import values fell by only 12% with 
the implication that less garments of a higher price were imported since the value 
falls by less than the volume flux. This difference is even more pronounced for quota 
categories where import volumes fell by 50% with a 27% decrease in the value. In 
contrast, in non quota categories, import volume and value (in unit categories) rose 
by 40% and 25% respectively indicating a fall in prices. However the notion that 
importers would switch their import basket due to quotas was soundly rebutted by 
large retailers since allocated quota is apportioned across all firms in the group who 
supply different maket segments22.  
 
                                                
21 Although retail defends all allegations of quota trading, there is some evidence that it did occur in the 
immediate wake of restrictions with agents commanding a premium of 20-30% (Bisseker 2006). 




 “The DTI does not realise that there is not one buyer per quota classification in big 
organisations. Each classification is shared across divisions with differing age 
groups within gender such that it is not unusual for a single classification to be split 
between 6 or 8 buyers and then manage this to ensure that we did not overbuy.”  
 
9. The second year of quotas: 2007‐2008 
This section reviews macroeconomic trade and firm level data for the first six months 
of 2008. The main purpose is to evaluate whether, over the longer term, quotas have 
begun to have the desired positive impact on employment and competitiveness of the 
industry. The first measure of success to be evaluated is trade performance.  
 
9.1 Trade 
In the first half of 2008 (January to June), imports of apparel totaled R3,580 million, 
an increase 32.16% on the comparable 2007 period23. Imports from China totaled 
R2,310m, a share of 64.47% in total imports and a increase of 32% on comparable 
2007 imports.  In second place was India with R1,410m or a 4% share, closely 
followed by Mauritius with R1,320m (4% share). Quota imports from China totaled 
R976m for January to June 2008, an increase of 18% on the relevant 2007 figure. 
However, the share of quota imports in total imports from China fell for 46.29% in 
2007 (Jan-Jun) to 42.30% in 2008. This reinforces previous conclusions that i) 
quotas have reduced activity from China in quota lines but ii) activity in non quota 
lines has increased, with the net result that imports from China have increased 
year on year. However, quotas have reduced China’s share in total imports from 
66.20% in 2007 to 64.47% in 2008. 
 
Table 23 below shows total imports and quota imports for comparable 2006, 2007 
and 2008 periods. Several conclusions are reached which reinforce earlier findings: i) 
quotas have successfully reduced imports from China in quota lines which fell by 
29% for the comparable 2006 and 2008 periods; and ii) quotas reduced the share of 
quota imports in total imports from China.  
 
                                                
23 Kipling 2008 argues that the year on year increase is more likely 13-14% once the 2007 import statistics are 
inflated by the R393m-R420m (or 38.5 to 42m units) in imports brought forward for purchasing in 2006 in 






 China   Change 
 2006 2007 2008 06-08 
Total imports 2058.81 1793.38 2307.86 12% 
Quota imports 1373.24 830.17 976.23 -29% 
% share total M 76.53% 66.20% 64.47% -12.06% 




National bargaining council figures for 2008 show a continued decline in 
employment with a further 4682 jobs lost in the first eight months of 2008 ( 
 
 
Figure 23). This brings total job losses to 7449 since quotas began with 
employment sitting at 67,007 as of 31 August 2008. This is despite a period of 
expansion from new entrants entering into the industry between September 2007 and 
June 2008. However, for the entire quota period, industry strength has deteriorated 











   
 
Figure 25 and  
Figure 26 below decompose the national figures by province. The sudden increase in 
the number of firms after 2007 for the Northern Province is most probably a reflective 
of greater Bargaining Council compliance rather than new entrants into the industry 
especially given persistent job losses during this time.  Ironically, during a recent 
(Sep) 2008 survey of South African manufacturing firms, it was revealed that 
employees do not want to be registered with the bargaining council and UIF since 











Evidence collected during a recent survey of South African clothing manufacturers 
largely confirms the negative impact of quotas on the industry, particularly in 
respect of quotas on fabric. The findings are essentially a continuation of the trends 
revealed by 2007 interviews which are reported in Section A.  
 
Fabric availability and price 
An endemic problem is the fabric shortage due to poorly contrived quota allocation 
mechanisms and implementation systems which expose authorities’ ignorance and 
incomprehension of the fundamental issues which underpin the real problems in the 
sector. Kipling 2008 states: 
 
“It is globally acknowledged that China is the most cost effective supplier of fabric 
and a major source of fabric to all apparel producing nations who are exporting to 
South Africa and therefore direct competitors to South African apparel 
manufacturers. Restricting South African clothing manufacturers direct access to 
Chinese fabric would give South African competitors (…) a distinct competitive 
advantage.”  
 
Quota utilisation in the first half of 2008 closely follows the pattern of usage in 2007 




problems with the manner in which quotas were allocated and the procedures and 
regulations for the granting of additional quota24.  
 
Table 24: Quota u>lisa>on for fabrics: 2007 and 2008 
Period Knits Wovens 
 60.05 60.06 52.08 52.09 52.10 56.14 
Jan-Dec 07 30.4% 39.1% 71.3% 15.3% 56.2% 55.4% 
Jan-Dec 08 9.9% 16.7% 26.5% 5.7% 20.5% 26.2% 
                 Source: Clotrade 2008 
 
Two thirds of the respondents in the 2008 survey of manufacturers indicated that 
they had been negatively affected by fabric shortages or delays. Of these, 45% 
reported they had suffered a severe adverse impact whilst the remaining 55% felt 
that the negative impact was manageable. Where some firms did not suffer fabric 
shortages, they reported problems relating to deteriorating fabric quality25. 
Furthermore, 41% of respondents believed that quotas had led to significant 
increases in local fabric prices. Three of the firms in the sample (10%) did not 
respond to the question on price. In two cases, this is due to the fact that the fabric is 
not available in South Africa at any price. In the third case, it was argued that local 
mills were so incompetent that they were not even worth consideration as a potential 
supply source, thus ruling out the possibility of price comparisons. 
 
Figure 28 summarises the response pattern. Only 30% of firms believed they were 
unaffected by fabric quotas at all. 37% of respondents were affected by both fabric 
non availability and increasing prices. 7% reported increasing prices but no problems 
with supply; 26% reported supply problems but did not believe that prices had 
increased. Ione firm argued that the closure of some major South African fabric 
                                                
24 Kipling 2008 illustrates one specific case in point. T-shirts was a product specifically excluded from quota 
whilst quota was implemented on fabric for the use in the manufacture of T-shirts. Imports of T-shirts from 
China totaled 81 million units in 2007, up 36% on 2006 imports and this trend has continued into 2008. Imports 
of T-shirts for the first six months if 2008 totaled R36.6m, up 16% on the comparable 2007 period.  This growth 
in imports during the quota period has likely been at the expense of local T-shirts manufactured  in 2006 which 
may explain the low utilisation of the quota. What is more, should the current trend in imported T-shirts persist, 
this will result in a major decline in demand for knitted single jersey fabric Kipling, J. (2008). Analysis of 
imports of apparel: January - June 2008. Cape Town: Clotrade. 
















Comments from firm representatives illustrate the above points: 
 
“As far as the beneficial impact of quotas on the local market is concerned, these 
have been negligible. But they have made doing business more difficult The 
quotas are a blunt instrument and have not taken into account the fact that a 
number of fabrics and garments that were being imported from China are not 
readily available in SA.” 
 
“Application for extra quota took over four months. This resulted in numerous 
orders being cancelled while our fabric was stuck in the docks awaiting 
clearance.” 
 
Output and margins 
To measure the effectiveness of quotas in stimulating local manufacturing activity, 
firms were asked to report on their output levels during 2008. 14% reported that 
they had produced more garments since quotas, 59% produced less and 28% 
produced the same as before quotas. However, the real story is in the margins.  
 
Of those respondents who reported that their output had expanded due to quotas, 
60% said that margins had fallen whilst the remaining 40% reported that margins 
had remained the same. Of those respondents who reported that their output had 
contracted during the quota period, 82% reported that their margins had also fallen 
and for 57% of these, the fall was severe. In at least one case, this resulted in the 
organisation running at a loss. 6% managed to maintain their margins and only 12% 
(one firm with a highly specialised and technical product) reported that margins had 
(marginally) increased. Finally, of those respondents who reported the same level of 
Price increase & fabric shortage 
37% 
No price increase & fabric shortage 
26% 
 
No fabric shortage & price increase 
7% 
 





output before and during quotas, 50% reported that margins had fallen while the 
other 50% said that margins had been maintained.  
 
In summary, not one firm both increased its output and its margins during the 
quota period; either the gains to be had from increased sales were summarily 
negated by falling margins or the gains to be had from increased margins were offset 
by falling output volumes.26  
 
Competitiveness and output mix 
43% of respondents reported that they had changed their output mix due to quotas. A 
somewhat unexpected result is that this shift was predominantly toward more 
complex (69%), high value added (23%) garments with only 23% reporting a shift 
toward garments of lower complexity. This is the antithesis of what is expected from 
quantitative restrictions. However, there is significant qualitative evidence that firms 
are struggling to meet the new requirements in terms of greater garment complexity 
and enhanced quality. 
 
“Having no quota available forced us to task local contractors with production 
complexity beyond their capacity and/or capability. Orders were delayed and 
customers cancelled.” 
 
“We have received orders for garments with greater complexity which is hard on 
labour.” 
 
This is conceivably due to the continued exodus of skills form the industry. Problems 
with recruiting machinist and other production staff have intensified in the last twelve 
months. 67% of respondents reported skills shortages and gaps in their production 
line with fill times ranging from two to twelve weeks. 27% of respondents reported 
that they are tackling skills shortages by training internally. Reasons given as to why 
machinists are leaving the industry still partially relate to the provident fund (55%) 
and flight to the informal industry which is consistent with findings of the 2007 survey. 
However, more recent opinions emphasise the fading popularity of manufacturing 
jobs amongst young people:  
 
                                                
26 Two firms attributed falling output volumes to the slowdown of the general economy such that the analysis 
comes with the important caveat that it is not always possible to disentangle the effects of the quotas and the 




“We initially thought that the lack of machinists was due to the provident fund and 
UIF but we are now of the opinion that machinists feel that they work too hard 
and the new generation has an attitude of not wanting to work in a factory.” 
 
Protection from foreign competition and customer relations 
 Problems with fabric quality, the lack of ranges and postponed delivery dates for 
garments, all directly as a result of quotas, had an adverse impact on customer 
relations for 37% of respondents. What is more, manufacturers convey retailer 
sentiments that their current predicament is largely self inflicted.  
 
“Our customers have become more distant with price being the only criteria...” 
 
“Our customers believe that as manufacturers we requested the quota which is 
simply not true. As a result, they sought cheaper garments elsewhere, and found 
even better value than China in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Malaysia and Myanmar, or 
simply resorted to buying transhipped garments.” 
 
 
The belief that local firms have lost business to illegal imports is incongruent. 
 
“A lot of my customers buy from the Chinese who are able to supply quota 
items...” 
 
Firms were asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 (1=lowest; 10=highest) the 
effectiveness of quotas in providing protection from import competition. A breakdown 











 In general, firms argue that relief from foreign competition was temporary and 
short-lived because customers sought goods elsewhere and new sources were 




decrease once quotas had expired, responses show that although 37% of firms 
expect their orders to fall (with 17% expecting a major fall), 30% expect their order 
books to grow. 33% expect their orders to be unchanged post quota. Firms argue 
that rising costs in China will be a major factor in influencing future sourcing 
decisions and that this will govern the extent to which orders will revert to China. 
However, retailers emphasize the non-cost benefits of dealing with Chinese suppliers 
which may override price concerns: 
 
“China prices are not the best in the World in quota and non quota 
classifications... China is however, more reliable in delivery date achievement 
and quality predictability than some of the cheaper sources.” 
 
11. Evaluating the justiWication for the quota intervention  
The effectiveness of any particular industrial policy intervention should be tested 
against how it meets the two primary concerns of sustainable industrial policy, 
namely, consumer welfare and the competitiveness of the sector. The welfare 
concern spans issues of employment in the sector, and consumption focusing on the 
standard of living (particularly of the poor) proxied by the price and availability of 
cheap wage goods. The competitiveness concern, on the other hand, focuses on the 
long term sustainability of the sector. The complexity of managing the welfare and 
competitiveness foci require that sectoral interventions are based on sound and 
detailed knowledge of the dynamics governing the particular sector, well grounded 
information and analysis of their impacts and sustained consultation with the 
business (Morris, 2007). Rodrik (2004) asserts that, increasingly, there is recognition 
for the need to embed private initiative into the framework of public action. Hence the 
autonomy of the state is replaced by the paradigm of a ‘learning government’. 
Industrial policy provides the opportunity for government to interact with private 
enterprises and learn about the constraints that exist and the opportunities that are 
available. Industry has identified three key areas to inform their response: the source 
of the problem in the sector, the information basis of interventions, and the detailed 
mechanisms characterising the China quotas (Morris, 2007). Hence, this report 
elicited information from enterprises in order to provide detailed feedback about the 
impact of quotas on the industry from the industry. This is a critical missing link 





There are three primary reasons why quotas could and would not meet the 
objectives set by the DTI. First, the timing of the intervention - quotas came too late. 
Second, the motivation for the intervention - the real problem was never 
identified. China is simply a symptom of other underlying problems, not the cause. 
Third, the scope of the intervention and manner of its implementation. These shall 
each be dealt with systematically in following sections.  
 
The timing of quotas 
According to Kipling (2008) the crucial error lies not with the intervention itself, but 
with the timing. To understand this position, it is necessary to situate the imposition of 
quotas in the context of developments in the clothing manufacturing industry leading 
up to the event. 2002 witnessed some key changes in the South African clothing 
industry triggered in principle by the collapse of the Rand. Key players in the industry 
began to look beyond South Africa’s borders albeit for different reasons; 
manufacturers were chasing exports and with their supply needs marginalised, 
retailers were compelled to seek alternative (foreign) suppliers. This marked a 
paradigm shift in mindset where industry went from blinkered to global and South 
Africa transformed from being a net earner of foreign currency to a net user. 
Coincidentally, in 2003 Clotrade sought protection for the industry on three primary 
grounds: i) illegal imports and dumping; ii) China not competing on a level playing 
field, and iii) the huge distortion factor posed by undervaluations and underinvoicing 
of imports. Each of these arguments warrants elaboration:  
 
i) Illegal imports: Kipling (2008) asserts that South Africa has “porous” borders. The 
surge in imports in 2003 exposed custom’s inability to control its borders and to 
prevent illegal imports and transshipments. Recent trade data suggests that this 
threat remains with an increased level of such activity indicated since quotas were 
introduced. This is gleaned from massive increases in imports from regions which 
have historically low levels of imports, such as Zimbabwe, although Singapore (and 
Malaysia) are commonly fingered as gateways. As one interviewee put it: 
 
“As soon as I heard about quotas, my first thought was: How can I get 




garments made up there and sent to South Africa with my Company’s label 
on. The answer was: There is no difference, the stuff is still made in China, 
just the paperwork changes because it leaves from Singapore!” 
 
The exact magnitude of transshipments and round-tripping will be revealed at the 
end of 2008 when imports from suspect countries fall away following the withdrawal 
of restrictions and sourcing patterns change. 
 
ii) Unfair playing fields: The origins of China’s dominance are diverse, although most 
pundits accredit it to its industrial policy. Kipling (2008) argues that the cornerstone of 
China’s policy is to fix the currency against the US currency to achieve a measure of 
undervaluation, provide non-repayable loans at 1½% interest per annum, and export 
incentive of 18% per annum payable in cash. These factors combine to yield a 
benefit that far outweighs any of the usual factors which enhance a country’s 
comparative advantage such as proximity to markets, a stable business environment, 
market access and skilled labour.  
 
iii) Undervaluation/underinvoicing: When a large importer places an order with its 
Chinese supplier, there is an automatic 10% redundancy/reject margin built into 
production. On a global scale, this translates into billions of dollars worth of overruns. 
Furthermore, since these garments are fully costed into the invoice amount and thus 
are thus effectively already paid for, they are available to spillover markets for 
“literally beans”.  Since South Africa has similar styles and tastes to the United 
States, coupled with the convenience that it runs 6 months behind US fashion, its 
market is particularly suited to these overruns.  
Clotrade first requested quantitative controls in 2003, emphasizing the need for swift 
and decisive efforts to curb illegal and unfair imports. Action by the DTI only came in 
2006.  The outcome might have been different had the DTI acted with the same 
speed and proficiency of the US and EU who suffered a surge in imports following 
the termination of the MFA. In both cases, quotas and safeguards were in place by 
April 2005. As it was, by the time South African authorities acted, the industry had 
lost much of its critical mass. Since the clothing industry depends on a critical mass 




find it hard to compete effectively on a global stage where firms are forced to 
compete on the basis of efficiency and flexibility. Kipling concludes that: 
“Had the Voluntary Restraint been imposed in January 2004, even at the 
current level proposed, before 20,500 jobs had been lost in the clothing 
industry and when the restraint would have been equal to 80% of the imports 
of the previous year 2003, when 215 million units and 8 million kilos were 
imported, it would have been a successful intervention ” (Kipling 2007)  
 
Motivation for quotas.  
When implemented correctly and timeously, Kipling (2008) argues that quotas are an 
effective mechanism for dealing with illegal imports:  
“Clotrade was, and is in favour of quantitative controls as a mechanism for 
addressing disruptive surges of imports brought about as a result of unfair 
trade practices, gross undervaluations or dumping of product in the SA 
market.” (Kipling 2007) 
Clotrade’s lack of support for quotas was not in principle, but in the detail (Kipling 
2007). Quotas are not an effective industrial policy measure to address employment 
and competitiveness issues which was the stated objective of the DTI. Whether this 
was simply a case of misdiagnosis of the real cause, or a correct diagnosis with the 
wrong prescription, is controversial. Whatever the case, there are several key 
arguments warning against the use of quotas in their current scope and form.  
First, the fundamental problem does not simply lie with profiteering by retailers or the 
surge in Chinese imports, but in the lack of competitiveness of the domestic clothing 
sector relative to Asia as a whole. China is simply the “vanguard of the wedge”; a 
symptom of greater underlying problems such as the fact that local firms generally 
lack the production capabilities – technology and knowledge of World Class 
manufacturing – to compete on price, quality and flexibility. The reluctance of 
individual firms to aspire to world class manufacturing principles and incorporate 
WCM practices into their factories penetrates far deeper than competitive pressure 
from the Chinese. Morris and Reed (2008) reveal that local manufacturers face 
significant skills constraints which inhibit and retard efforts by individual firms to make 
the transition to WCM. It is these greater issues, like the lack of skills, which impact 
directly on the competitiveness of the industry. They will not be resolved by import 
restrictions, a view which is broadly confirmed by retailers who scored a zero when 




their objectives of stimulating local manufacturing activity, and improved productivity 
and efficiency of local producers. One source comments: 
“There have been no published success stories, there are no new factories, 
the ones that are operating are hanging in desperately, local suppliers have 
got even more clever at taking product out to come in at a price, deliver 
performance is no better, quality is worse, turnaround time is worse, 
innovation is no better, factories have still closed, suppliers are complaining 
that it's all our fault because our price expectation is too keen…” 
Second, competitiveness is closely associated with wage costs and working hours 
(Lawrence et. al. 2006). The former is rooted in general labour market rigidity in the 
South African economy toward which the considerable power of unions is a major 
contributor. The latter is a controversial point with many manufacturers arguing that a 
shift or piecework system would significantly raise productivity and better enable 
them to compete with Asian countries which operate along these lines. 
  
Third, there is insufficient obligational cooperation along the domestic value chain to 
ensure systemic competitiveness. Once again, the cause of the problem does map 
directly back to Chinese competition but has political and historical roots. The textiles 
and clothing industries have never been “close” with textiles manufacturers unable to 
meet quality and lead times requirements, as well as historically exporting rather than 
supplying the local clothing industry. Again, quotas are unlikely to occasion the 
formation of strategic and collaborative relationships between these sectors, 
particularly given their short time horizon. In fact, this problem may actually escalate 
if local textiles firms act on plans to export more and increase the level of industrial 
textiles produced in future in order to reduce their exposure to Chinese competition.  
 
Good industrial policy would tackle the source of the problem, i.e. value chain 
alignment and pipeline development, something which quotas do not. On a positive 
note, however, despite significant potential for quotas to derail the delicate 
obligational relationships between manufacturers and retailers that have been 
fostered over the past few years, largely thanks to the Business Alliance, this has not 
transpired. Firm level interviews reveal that supply relations remain on a reasonable 
standing between local suppliers and major retailers, and firms continue to benefit 
from participation in the clothing clusters established over the past two years.  




about the ability of local fabric suppliers to deliver on quantity and quality across the 
board. As one major retailer explained there are limits to this process: 
 
“We intend to increase our local component significantly, but are extremely 
concerned that there are a number of fabrics that the local market cannot make 
that are identical or similar, correct fashionability for the season and of correct 
texture and weight.”  
 
In addition they warn that a price which is “too far out” will simply lead to the 
procurement of ready-made garments from quota-free areas.  
 
Implementation, scope and allocation of quotas 
With regard to the quotas themselves, the Business Alliance (2006) observed that 
without consultation with key players (retailers and manufacturers), and direct 
feedback from the industry itself, the DTI would lack the detailed knowledge 
necessary to design a quota mechanism with the necessary flexibility to handle 
ongoing production incapacities and market distortions. The limited production 
capacity of local fabric firms to meet demand, and in some cases, the complete 
inability of local firms to produce the fabric at all, spelled chaos and significant market 
disruption in the short term. These capacity shortages were a key reason why quotas 
would likely fail to stimulate output in the local industry with many producers simply 
unable or, in the opinion of some, unwilling to.  
 
“The local industry did absolutely nothing to step up to the plate in 
delivering extra capacity to make up for quota restrictions and this cost us 
market share loss.” 
 
Neither would the DTI be able to appreciate the full range of products affected, or 
deal with the direct, but also indirect and unintended, consequences of the quotas. In 
the long term, the problem was also regarded as unlikely to be rectified given the 
short-term nature of the intervention. Edwards et al (2006) warned that the inclusion 
of textiles in the restrictions could have the perverse consequence of choking supply 
to the manufacturing industry, the very industry the measures are intended to help. 
Morris argued that this was also potentially the case where clothing manufacturers 





Key stakeholders argue that quotas on fabric directly prevent South African 
manufacturers from being competitive since China is globally acknowledged to be the 
most effective supplier of fabric. Since all of South Africa’s competitors, both Far 
Eastern and African, source their fabric from China, restricting South Africa’s access 
to this cheap fabric gives these countries a distinct competitive advantage (Clotrade 
2007a, 2007b, 2008). Apart from the implications of price increases from restrictions 
on supply, manufacturers report increasingly poor delivery performance and product 
quality from local fabric suppliers in the wake of quotas. However, even where firms 
are not directly affected by restrictions, one senior official contends that quotas are a 
“psychological problem” since they strengthen the position of fabric suppliers and 
reduce clothing manufacturers’ bargaining power. As a result, lead times increase 
which puts manufacturers under pressure.    
The restriction on certain fabrics but not on the fully made-up garment from those 
fabrics led to the bizarre consequence of increasing the incentive to import the ready-
made garments.  Also, since quota was allocated against previous imports, new firms 
were prevented from entering the market and existing firms could not innovate and 
develop garments using new fabrics embodying the latest technology. Most 
manufacturers interviewed dismissed quotas as a thinly disguised political tool to 
achieve leverage with respect to Bargaining Council compliance. As one interviewee 
put it, 
“SACTWU decides who get additional quota. We import most of our fabric and 
use a fabric that is not available anywhere in South Africa. Our quota has been 
used up. But to get additional quota, you have to prostitute yourself in terms of 
additional machinists, committing a percentage of turnover for training and 
undertaking to buy more local fabric. Quotas have nothing to do with the needs of 
the industry, they are a political instrument.” 
Retail reinforces this view:  
“(…) some retailers sold their souls for additional quota so that playing fields were 
manipulated at labour whim.” 
 
12. Conclusion 
Preliminary analysis of macroeconomic trade and employment data and evidence 
from key stakeholders confirm earlier findings that quotas have failed as an 




clothing industry. By all accounts, the crisis which gripped the industry in 2005 has 
since deepened whilst the challenges facing South African manufacturers have been 
amplified by general economic downturn.  
 
Macroeconomic trade data shows that whilst quotas have effectively curtailed 
Chinese clothing imports, especially in quota lines, local firms continue to be 
challenged by competitors from emergent supplier locations which are even 
cheaper than China. This has had a deleterious effect on the reprieve from foreign 
competition that quotas were intended to afford the local industry. A combination of 
increasingly challenging economic conditions and the renewed exposure to China’s 
formidable competitive forces is likely to see the South African clothing industry in a 
worse position in the future than from which it started prior to quotas. 
The government has demonstrated a tunneled vision perspective on the clothing 
sector crisis, bowing to the narrow political agendas of sectoral interest groups. 
This is despite considerable international evidence that import restrictions would not 
be the silver bullet that would boost employment and revive output. The belief that 
low cost Chinese imports are the cause of the crisis reflects a simplistic and shallow 
understanding of the complexity of the problems which engulf the sector. As 
predicted, the DTI has had to backtrack on its initial statement that quotas “were cast 
in stone” and additional quota has been granted albeit with strings attached (Clotrade 
2007b, 2008).  
The empirical evidence presented in previous sections suggests that quotas have 
had little impact on employment and output but instead may have simply 
encouraged retailers to prematurely identify alternative supply bases. Given 
rising costs in China and increasing pressure to conform with environmental and 
human rights standards, this may have robbed local manufacturers of a window 
of opportunity in which they could win supply contracts before alternative foreign 
suppliers were established. According to one firm interviewed, whereas retailers 
previously “just imported from China, they have now developed a whole import 
strategy”. Furthermore, if suppliers are secured in even lower cost locations that 
China, this could exert additional downward pressure on local supplier prices and 
further erode their bargaining position relative to their customers, swinging the 




counterproductive, especially where fabric unavailability had created an incentive to 
import already made-up garments.   
 
The failure of quotas to achieve forecasts for employment and manufacturing activity 
should constitute sufficient motivation for their discontinuation. However, if domestic 
reasons are inadequate for quota withdrawal, growing tension in South Africa’s trade 
relation with China is additional motivation. Chinese authorities are openly 
discontented with the repercussions which restrictions on their clothing imports have 
on their domestic industry and employment which are unjustified if they do not reduce 
cheap imports into South Africa as a whole but simply fuel clothing exports from other 
countries (Enslin-Payne 2007).  Given the significant contribution of clothing and 
textiles industries to their employment and GDP, the Chinese are unlikely to find the 
agreement conducive to sustainable future trade relations. This disquiet also comes 
amid recent controversies relating to human rights abuse in some of the newly 
emerging supplier countries such as Myanmar (Robbins 2007). In tandem with the 
Chinese, the WTO has issued a similar warning against the efficacy of safeguards 
which in the US and the EU had not led to a reduction in imports but had simply 
benefited a host of other countries rather than alleviating the burden on local 
manufacturers (Le Roux 2007).  The Chinese quota agreement has run a substantial 
part of its life time without achieving any of its purported aims. It remains to be seen 
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